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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYSIS OF VENEZUELA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING
THE PERIOD OF THE BETANCOURT DOCTRINE AND
CALDERA'S IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM
by
Franklin Acosta
This thesis examines the foreign policy of Venezuela
during the period of the Betancourt Doctrine (1945-1948 and
1959-1963), and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism (1969-1973).
The study seeks to determine whether, and to what extent the
pursuit of political and economic interests and ideology
determined Venezuela's foreign policy.
Based on primary and secondary sources, this study
examines political economy and ideology and how these
affected the outcome of Venezuela's foreign policy.
The major finding of this thesis is that Venezuelan
foreign policy was a pragmatic one but it was rationalized
within an ideological framework. In fact, Venezuela was
most concerned in pursuing its domestic economic and
political interests but these were hidden behind an
ideological facade.
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1INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify
whether, and to determine to what extent the pursuit of po-
litical and economic interests and ideology can affect for-
eign policy. The case under study will be that of
Venezuela, and for purpose of analysis we will examine
Venezuelan foreign policy during the period of the Betan-
court Doctrine 1945-1948 and 1959-1964 (time in which Betan-
court was in power), and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism
1969-1974 (time in which Caldera was in power). The study
sets out to analyze the following: 1) The relationship be-
tween political and economic interests, ideology and the
making of the policies of states in their international
relations or relations with other states. 2) The study also
seeks to determine whether, and to what extent the pursuit
of political and economic interests and ideology determined
Venezuela's foreign policy during the aforementioned
periods.
In this study "political and economic interests" are
those political and economic factors that at any given point
in time can determine the choices of statesmen in formulat-
ing foreign policy; and "ideology" is those sets of values,
beliefs and principles that statesmen use for guiding or
justifying their actions in foreign policy.
2The content of this study relates to that realm of for-
eign policy theory that argues that ideology does play a
role in foreign policy, but that it is relatively minor in
comparison to the real interests behind it. In this intro-
duction we tentatively hold the view that in the case of the
Betancourt Doctrine, which urged non recognition of de facto
or non-popularly elected governments and their expulsion
from the Organization of American States; and Caldera's
Ideological Pluralism, which proclaimed unity among Latin
American nations regardless of ideological differences, ide-
ology might have acted as a facade, behind which was hiding
the pursuit of political and economic interests. The main
task, therefore, will be to determine to what extent this
holds true, and how the Betancourt Doctrine and Caldera's
Ideological Pluralism fit into the general framework of for-
eign policy and theories thereof.
The findings of this study will help to shed more light
on how nation-states behave in international relations; how
domestic and external factors combine in making foreign pol-
icy; and how foreign policy can be used to satisfy domestic
demands and achieve domestic goals. This study's contribu-
tion, though limited and modest, may help enhance the under-
standing of how and why countries behave in certain manner
in their dealings with other actors on the international
scene. The findings of this study may also help discern,
3with a certain degree of accuracy, the real intent behind a
country's foreign policy.
General Outline of Approach
In our analysis of Venezuela's foreign policy we will
divide the work into four chapters. The initial chapter de-
velops a framework to include what has been written about
foreign policy. We examine also what has been written about
political economy and ideology. Chapter One also describes
the methodology and approach to be used.
Chapter Two examines some of the antecedents to the Be-
tancourt Doctrine, giving a general background of
Venezuela's foreign policy prior to 1945. The study then
sets out to examine Venezuela's foreign policy during the
period of the Betancourt Doctrine. Here, we examine rela-
tions with Latin America, the Caribbean and the United
States. It must be pointed out, however, that this chapter
deals only with the periods Romulo Betancourt was in power,
1945-1948 and 1959-1964. The Perez Jimenez period, 1948-
1958, and the Raul Leoni period, 1964-1969, will be men-
tioned only in passing. These periods, though significant
in terms of the development of Venezuela's foreign policy,
remain beyond the scope of this study.
Chapter Three deals with Venezuela's foreign policy
during the period of Caldera's Ideological Pluralism (1969-
41974). This chapter examines the most important develop-
ments which influenced the Christian Democrats' foreign pol-
icy.
Chapter Four, the concluding chapter, is the linking
chapter. This chapter defines the importance of the preced-
ing chapters, and fits chapters two and three into the con-
ceptual framework of chapter one. This concluding chapter
looks at the findings of this study and their importance.
Some speculative propositions will be made about the possi-
bility of applying the present approach to other cases.
5CHAPTER I
THEORY AND THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY
This study deals with the questions: What is foreign
policy?, and, what are the most important factors that con-
dition foreign policy? Foreign policy consists of actions
taken by states in their relations with other states. These
relations we call international relations. We define state
here as a body of people occupying a definite territory, po-
litically organized under one government and autonomous and
independent from other governments. It is important then
that we identify the state as the main actor in interna-
tional relations. As John H. Herz states, "Despite the con-
spicuous rise of international organizations and suprana-
tional agencies ... the states remain the primary actors in
international relations. " Contrarily to Herz's belief,
Lester Pearson argues that the influence of the state in in-
ternational relations is weakening. Pearson states, "The
effective unit of foreign policy and strategy is no longer
the nation-state, however large, but the coalition of such
states ... "2
Whichever way the controversy of whether or not the
state is the most important actor in international relations
is settled, we must deal with reality, and reality tells
that even if weakened, the state as a politically autonomous
6unit, still holds the monopoly of decision-making power in
international relations. And for that matter, relations
among them are still the most important in the international
milieu. Evidence of this is that most definitions of for-
eign policy refer to the state as the major protagonist in
international relations. According to Frankel, "Foreign
policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to
some appreciable extent relations between one state and oth-
ers. "3 There is also a whole "System School" that dis-
agrees, but for the purposes of this study we will maintain
the view that the state, as defined above, is the most im-
portant actor in international relations.
Millar stresses the influence of domestic factors in
affecting or determining foreign policy of states. He
states,
"Foreign policy is presumably something
less than the sum of all policies which
have an effect upon a national govern-
ment's relat ons with other national
governments. "
The reasoning behind this position is that due to technol-
ogy, communication, and the high degree of sophistication of
nuclear weapons distances have shortened, and today there-
fore there are not domestic policies so internal as to be
completely isolated from the rest of the world. Domestic
policies, indeed, can have such an effect on foreign coun-
tries that those policies that are exclusively "domestic",
7.
and that have no effect on the rest of the world, are con-
sidered "something less." The remaining of the "sum of all
policies", is foreign policy.
Reynolds argues that the modern international system
has become such a single unit, and so closely interrelated
that action on the part of one state is constrained by the
perceived domestic circumstances, as well as by the actions
of other states, and how it perceives other states.5 In a
sense, he argues that foreign policy is not made in a vacuum
and that it is conditioned by the domestic and international
environment. The success, therefore, of foreign policy de-
pends on how well policy-makers take into account both fac-
tors in formulating foreign policy. This study adopts the
position that in analyzing foreign policy one must take into
account domestic, as well as external circumstances. In
this regard, our analysis of foreign policy has something in
common with London's position in his book, The Making of
Foreign Policy. He bases his argument on the premise that
foreign and domestic politics are so inextricably linked
that one cannot function without the other. Accordingly
they "resemble the positive and negative components of elec-
tric current: Eliminate one and the other will not func-
tion; they produce power only when combined." 6
With this brief consideration of the question as to
what "foreign policy" is, we next examine foreign policy mo-
8tivations as a corollary to the issue discussed above. For-
eign policy motivation is a crucial point in the present
study because knowing what foreign policy is, and where does
it take place, would be pointless if we ignore what moti-
vates foreign policy in the case of Betancourt and Caldera.
According to Hans Morgenthau and the Realist school,
the key concept governing the actions of statesmen in domes-
tic and international politics is that of interests defined
as power. Interests defined in terms of power, he says,
"provides the link between reason trying to understand in-
ternational politics and the facts to be understood."7  The
premise of Morgenthau's theory is that for statesmen to be
successful in the game of politics, they must equate their
own personal and state's interests with power. In other
words, the main task of statesmen in making foreign policy
is to bring into line the desires of their nation with the
power they have available for the pursuit of those desires.
Foreign policy, then, must be conditioned by the pursuit of
self-interests.
Morgenthau also states, "It is not enough for a govern-
ment to marshal national public opinion behind its foreign
policies. It must also gain the support of the public opin-
ion of other nations .. ."8 The reasoning behind his argu-
ment is that foreign policy is not only conditioned by do-
mestic factors, or by the domestic attractiveness of certain
9foreign policy, but by the appeal of such policy to interna-
tional actors. This is, according to Morgenthau, an impor-
tant point because the degree of domestic popular support
that a policy enjoys, and the willingness of statesmen and
the people they lead, to sacrifice anything for the pursuit
of that policy they consider desirable and legitimate, is
not enough. Such policy is also conditioned by the degree
of support it receives from external actors. Otherwise, the
policy is doomed to fail by lack of support in the interna-
tional community.
There are some foreign policy theorists who would argue
that in examining the most important factors that condition
foreign policy one cannot ignore the role of societal fac-
tors. Rosenau, for example, states that there are domestic
forces, such as the press, pressure groups, parties, and
others that condition foreign policy. These forces, he
says, are no less important than the external forces toward
which the foreign policy is intended to be directed.9  This
is a relevant point, and a crucial one in terms of our study
because, as we shall examine, the Betancourt Doctrine and
Caldera's Ideological Pluralism did gain a great deal of
strength from the support they received from private eco-
nomic groups, labor unions, opposition parties and the
press.
10
The premises, the basic factors that must not be ig-
nored in making foreign policy, according to London, are a
nation's physical, economic and military conditions. These,
he terms national attributes. "In developing his policies,
no statesmen can afford to overlook certain basic factors,
premises which determine the scope of his planning and his
courses of action."1 0 Obviously London is saying that these
factors determine the limits or the range of statesmen in
formulating foreign policy. Indeed, statesmen cannot go be-
yond their available resources, but they can convert their
available resources into the main force behind their foreign
policy decisions.
Frankel, on the other hand, stresses the importance of
what he calls "inner element" as a conditioning factor of
foreign policy that is even more important than that re-
ferred to by London. Frankel states:
"The assessment of the environment does
not lead to decisions and to political
actions automatically, but only through
its fusion with an element existing
within the decision-makers. Many terms
are employed to denote t hiT,... element:
ideologies, doctrines ... "
Frankel's argument is that ideologies, beliefs and values
can influence statesmen in formulating their foreign poli-
cies. He uses the United States and the Soviet Union as
prime examples where ideological values lead to achieving
11
important objectives in foreign policy. These values, even
if they are not the primary determinants of foreign policy
in general, in some issues they may well be dominant.
History and events are factors that foreign policy the-
orists considered to be among the most important elements
that condition foreign policy. As T.B. Millar states: "The
majority of foreign policy decisions ... just grow. They
grow out of past policies ... [and] are heavily circum-
scribed by the logic of events ... much of a country's for-
eign policy is inherited. "12  To proceed further with the
discussion, we could say that Millar's argument is supported
by the view that events and experiences not only shape for-
eign policy in the sense that they help contribute to
heighten or loosen economic, military or diplomatic rela-
tions, but that they also shape foreign policy in the sense
of producing a distinctive type of leadership.13  This his-
tory-leadership relationship, we will find in our study when
we examine how Venezuela's long history of dictatorships
shaped the emergence of a new type of democratic leadership,
such as that of Romulo Betancourt and Rafael Caldera.
In summary, foreign policy consists of relations be-
tween actors in the international arena, of which the state
is the most important. The actions of one state in relation
to others are conditioned by domestic as well as by interna-
tional factors. The primary concern of all states is the
12
protection and pursuit of self-interests, which means that
no state will act against its own interests to preserve or
further those of another. In this study then we will ex-
plore the issue of ideology as another "factor" which leads
to foreign policy making.
Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy
Our purpose in the present study is to determine the
link, if any, which exists between ideology and political
behavior, and to what extent ideology makes a difference in
political behavior or in political action.
From Derek Heater's Contemporary Political Ideas we
draw the following:
"[Ideologies are] articulated sets of
ideals, ends, and purposes, which help
... to interpret the past, explain the
presen , and offer a vision for the fu-
ture.
According to Heater ideologies would give people a sense of
orientation. A sense of knowing where they come from, where
they are, and where they are going.
Marx on the other hand would argue that ideologies only
exist to maintain the ends and purposes of the dominant
classes.
"The real forces driving an ideologist
remain unconscious: patriotic feeling,
class interests ... Ideologists see that
their class is always trying to pile
larger burdens of labor on the toiling
13
masses. The social order seems unfair,
and 1 he ideologists want to justify
it."
For Marx ideology is false consciousness, mere thought that
is used to keep the status quo, and guide society in the di-
rection of the interests of the ruling class. As Drucker
states: "... an ideology ... is the intellectual tool of
the opposition class.1"16
Regarding the idea that ideology is false conscious-
ness, Plamenatz believes that "by false consciousness Marx
appears to have meant a set of mistaken beliefs ... Bour-
geois ideas about the state are, so Marx believed, an exam-
ple of false consciousness." 17 In general, Marx spoke of
ideology as if its primary function were to promote class
interests. To him the ideologies of the dominant class pro-
mote and protect its interests by justifying the established
order.
Speaking of ideologies Karl Mannhein argues that ide-
ologies are used not to show the real nature of a situation,
but that "they are regarded as more or less conscious dis-
guises ... the true recognition of which would not be in ac-
cord with the interests."18 The study of ideology, accord-
ing to Mannhein, "has made its task to unmask the more or
less conscious deceptions ... of human interests ... partic-
ularly those of political parties."1 9
14
In Robert D. Putnam's The Beliefs of Politicians we
find several definitions of ideology that could be useful in
terms of the present discussion. At this point we must re-
member that we are trying to explain: to what extent does
ideology explain anything about the nature of foreign pol-
icy? According to Putnam, then, a political actor may be
said to be ideologically inclined when he is: "1) Guided by
a belief system that is ... emotionally charged. 2) Hostile
and intolerant toward political opponents ... 3) Guided by a
comprehensive ... organized belief system." 2 0  This set of
characteristics obviously speaks about what an ideologically
inclined politician should be. However, as it refers to
ideology as belief, it fails to account for the pragmatic
politician, who though not ideologically oriented, still is
belief-oriented. This is precisely expressed by Sartori who
points out that beliefs are not necessarily ideologies. He
makes the difference between "ideological" and "pragmatic"
politicians. "By definition, then, not all political belief
systems are ideological ... pragmatism is also a state of
belief system." Then he goes on to state emphatically:
"the presence of beliefs does not suffice to qualify the
ideological nature of such beliefs: the pragmatic actor
also is belief oriented." 2 1
Regarding the question, how much does ideology affect
foreign policy, some theorists argue that ideologies are
15
used as a facade to justify the pursuit of the real
interests hiding behind it. For example, London states:
"Many decision makers and political ana-
lysts seem to believe that ideology is
used to justify policies and 5tions in-
stead of being shaped by it."
According to London, in analyzing foreign policy one should
be aware of the fallacy of equating foreign policy with the
ideological convictions of those who formulate it. More-
over, in the analysis of foreign policy, according to Lon-
don, ideology should be considered the means rather than the
end. In other words, ideology is a resource to achieve ob-
jectives.
This brings the discussion to Morgenthau's views on
ideology. For him ideologies are no more than disguises to
hide the pursuit of self-interests and power. "It is a
characteristic aspect of all politics", he suggests,
"domestic as well as international, that frequently its ba-
sic manifestations do not appear as what they actually are -
manifestations of a struggle for power."23 According to
Morgenthau, ideologies are used by statesmen to unite the
masses behind their efforts, and legitimize their policies.
Morgenthau also declares that: "the actor on the po-
litical scene cannot help 'playing an act' by concealing the
true nature of his political actions behind the mask of a
political ideology." 2 4 Morgenthau's position obviously re-
16
lates to that of Marx in the sense that they regard ideology
as means to seeking, keeping and justifying power.
The discussion comes to the point where we must briefly
examine the second dimension of ideology. In this study we
seek to demonstrate that the Betancourt Doctrine and
Caldera's Ideological Pluralism were linked to AD (Accion
Democratica) and COPEI's (Comit6 de organizaci6n Politica
Electoral Independiente) ideological tenets. These two were
Romulo Betancourt and Rafael Caldera's parties. We now pro-
ceed to examine some basic doctrine of the Social Democrats
(AD) and the Christian Democrats (COPEI).
We will refer to some basic tenets of Latin American
social democrats in the "APRISTA" sense, and in order to do
it we must keep in mind the close relationship between Latin
American social democracy and Latin American populism mainly
because as in the case of APRA and AD, both, social democ-
racy and populism, can be used to define their ideological
stands. APRA, for example, is regarded by some the oldest
social democrat party in Latin America, but we must also re-
member that APRA is a populist party. AD also was a pop-
ulist party between 1945-1948 but it later moved to a more
moderate stand.
Latin American populism, as viewed by Steven Ellner,
displays several fundamental characteristics: commitment to
radical reforms and electoral expansion, nationalism, and
17
advocacy of a multi-class party.2 3  These characteristics
heavily marked Betancourt's AD first government between
1945-1948. However, pragmatic considerations led Betan-
court's AD to adopt a more lenient stand in 1959. A stand,
more in accordance with Needler's definition of Latin Ameri-
can social democracy, "the impulse that animates the Aprista
parties might loosely be termed 'socialist' in the general
sense in which Christian Democrats are referred to as Chris-
tian Socialists ... They differ clearly from the socialist
parties proper, however, in being pragmatic, unbound by doc-
trine ... certainly not Marxists. "26 In general, social
democrats do not adhere to dogmas but instead to pragmatism,
and they are committed to democratic and economic reforms.
They believe in centralized planning and in channeling re-
sources as a means to bringing about the economic transfor-
mation of their countries.
Christian Democrats, on the other hand, though also
committed to the cause of the underprivileged, are appar-
ently more ideologically inclined than social democrats.
The essential object of Christian Democrats is to transfer
the teachings of Christianity into the political realm. As
stated by Louis Wasserman: "Christian socialism is the doc-
trine held by those who reject the elements of capitalist
society and accept the program of socialism as consistent
with Christian principles." 2 7
18
Christian Democrats argue that capitalism as well as
communism are exploitative in nature, one economically, the
other politically. Speaking about capitalism from the West,
Christian democrats say that "the system imposes upon the
workers a continual 'state of misery' ... [it] violates the
possibility of Christian brotherhood and replaces it with
... competition. "28 Communism, on the other hand, is re-
pelled on philosophical grounds because of its atheist na-
ture, but it is also rejected on ideological grounds. As a
Christian Democrat's international congress declared:
"[Christian Democracy] also rejects Marxists solutions which
propose to replace ... the dictatorship of capital with the
dictatorship of the state." 2 9  In essence, Christian
Democrats consider themselves an alternative third force,
against the exploitative nature of communism and capitalism.
Pluralism is another basic tenet of Christian Demo-
crat's doctrine. Pluralism is what brings unity where there
is diversity. The concept of Pluralism harmonizes the dif-
ferent tendencies of men in society, pulling together their
different views in order to face common necessities. As Ed-
uardo Frei Montalva, Chile's former president (1964-1970)
puts it,
"[Pluralism is an] optimistic philoso-
phy, which believes that it is possible
for men of the most distinct schools of
thought and most0 diverse beliefs to
march in common."
19
Pluralism then is a cohesive force. It is a force in which
different people, with different criteria, but with one com-
mon goal, merge with the purpose of pursuing their objec-
tives, achieving unity in the midst of diversity.
Social justice is also one of the foremost concepts in
Christian Democrats' doctrine. Social justice is that
quality through which a person in society conforms his own
desires, and all that is needed of him for the common good
of society.31 One of the main developments in Christian
Democratic doctrine, then, came in the last three decades
with the concept of international social justice, as a nec-
essary corollary to social justice. Rafael Caldera was the
one who took the task of transferring the concept of social
justice to the international arena. In Caldera's own words:
"There is one social justice: the one
demanding a higher duty of the strong
towards the weak ... this social justice
imposes what is necessary for the common
good ... It tells us that ... the
wealthier countries have greater 2 duties
toward the poorer countries ...
The reasoning behind Caldera's argument is that inter-
national social justice imposes an obligation on the wealthy
and developed countries of the world to help the poor and
underdeveloped nations. As in domestic social justice, the
achievement of the common good through unselfish consecra-
tion to improving the lot of others, is the main goal of in-
ternational social justice. International social justice
20
also calls for the poor nations of the world to be united
under the rubric of Ideological Pluralism. With this brief
consideration of the question as to how ideology relates to
foreign policy making, we next examine the issue of politi-
cal and economic interests as another factor which leads to
foreign policy making.
Political and Economic Interests and Foreign Policy Making
There are two issues to examine here: 1) Political and
economic. 2) Domestic and international. For several major
reasons, issues one and two must not be separated if we want
to make an accurate assessment of Venezuela's foreign pol-
icy. For instance: How could we examine Venezuela's for-
eign policy in terms of the oil industry without due consid-
eration to the role of the United States, as well as domes-
tic factors? How could we deal with Venezuela and the OPEC
issue without due consideration to internal demands as well
as external pressures? And finally, how could we accurately
address Venezuela's problems in joining the Andean Common
Market without due consideration to the opposition con-
fronted by the government from Venezuela's private business
group organizations?
Our premise then is that for countries to formulate
foreign policy they have to link domestic and international
politics and economics because the mutual impact between do-
21
mestic and international factors cannot be ignored. Roger
Tooze argues: "No process, policy, or event is unquestion-
ingly accepted as either purely economic or political or,
for that matter, as purely international or domestic. 33
Roger Tooze's argument relates to that of Millar (cited
above) in the sense that both consider that today there are
not domestic economic and political policies so internal as
to be completely isolated from the rest of the world and
vice versa.
But the major problem in understanding global politics,
according to Blake and Walters, has been the lack of concep-
tual frameworks addressing the issue of interrelationships
between internal and international economic and political
behaviors. It was not until recently that scholars began
research in this direction. Blake and Walters, like Tooze
and Millar, maintain that a complete understanding of global
relations cannot be attained unless we establish the neces-
sary linkages between factors:
"A complete understanding of the inter-
national political economy requires ...
a systematic examination of ... interre-
lationships ... between political and
economic matters, between the domestic
and international arena ... these vari-
ous sets of interrelationships3 2re them-
selves linked to one another."
Indeed, the essence of their argument is that this intercon-
nection between domestic and external factors becomes par-
22
ticularly evident in the formulating and analysis of foreign
policy. In the context of the present study, the main chal-
lenge will be to determine whether, or to what extent, the
Betancourt Doctrine and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism were
conditioned by the interconnection mentioned by Blake and
Walters.
Scholars who write within the "dependency" tradition
would argue, for instance, that there is indeed a linkage
between the domestic and international political economy but
that it is based on inequality. Accordingly, this inequal-
ity flows from the ties established between dominant elites
in the dependent and dominant countries, affecting the in-
ternal conditions of the dependent country and perpetuating
inequality. As stated by Theotonio Dos Santos: "[Dependency
is] a situation in which the economy of certain countries is
conditioned by the development ... of another economy to
which the former is subjected ... ."35 According to Dos San-
tos' statement, we could expect that the foreign policy of a
dominant power, such as the United States, will be an in-
strument to preserve and carry out the interests of North
American corporations located in a dominated or dependent
country such as Venezuela. Conversely, a dependent state's
foreign policy would be expected to coincide with the inter-
ests of the ruling elites in the dominated as well as in the
dominant country.
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In sum, disproportionate economic relations have
brought about an unequal relationship in which the dominant
country is expected to exert considerable influence in the
dependent country's foreign policy. The dependent country,
in turn, is expected to receive economic and/or political
compensation.
From the above, we may now state that our main task
will be to explain whether, and to what extent the linkage
between domestic-political and economic concerns and inter-
national-political and economic concerns, determined
Venezuela's foreign policy. Also, we will have to explain
whether ideology played a role in the determination of the
foreign policy of Venezuela, or if it was only a mean to
justify the ends. Finally we must discover whether, and to
what extent Venezuela's foreign policy during the period of
the Betancourt Doctrine and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism,
was determined by U.S.'s economic domination. In order to
deal with the aforementioned questions we will need to ex-
plore some of the literature written about Venezuelan for-
eign policy.
The Foreign Policy of Venezuela: A Summary View
Venezuelan foreign policy could be described as a com-
bination of idealism, pragmatism and the indefatigable
search for development. No study of contemporary Venezuelan
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foreign policy could exclude the decisive role that oil has
played in shaping foreign and domestic policies. Arturo U.
Pietri describes Venezuela as being heavily conditioned by
the politics and economics of oil:
"Oil is the fundamental and basic fact
of the Venezuelan destiny ... Everything
else loses significance ... All issues
... are nditioned, determined, created
by oil."
Uslar Pietri's view is supported by David E. Blank, who ar-
gues that Venezuelan politics have revolved around oil since
this was discovered at the turn of the twentieth century.3 7
Accordingly, oil has not only changed the country inside,
but its traditional posture of submissiveness toward exter-
nal actors, has also changed. Oil has indeed provided sup-
port for Venezuela's newly aggressive regional politics.
Franklin Tugwell also stresses the importance of oil in
Venezuela. He argues that Venezuela's government and the
economy have become so dependent on oil earnings, that oil
politics have come to operate as an independent variable in
regard to most other policy-making areas.38 It is clear
that Tugwell feels that all other areas of policy-making in
Venezuela depend on the politics of oil. Perhaps one of the
most accurate descriptions of the Venezuelan situation is
that made by Sheldon B. Liss. Regarding the idea that oil
determines Venezuela's foreign and domestic policies Liss
states that: "Venezuela realizes that its domestic future
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depends heavily upon its international economic relation-
ships, and its foreign policies are, more than ever, deter-
mined by the oil industry ... "39 Accordingly, if Venezuela
is to have a chance to develop it must successfully manage
its oil policies; and its oil policies and foreign policy,
must be in complete harmony.
Another factor that has significantly conditioned
Venezuela's foreign policy is that of perceived external po-
litical and economic threats, and how these external threats
relate to domestic concerns. As we shall see in our analy-
sis, there seems to be evidence supporting the view that
there is a relationship between democratic in-
stitutionalization in Venezuela and the conduct of foreign
policy. As stated by Charles D. Ameringer: "The conduct of
foreign policy provided yet another means for measuring the
institutionalization of Venezuelan democracy ... the
president's style in foreign affairs reflected his percep-
tions of internal conditions. "40 Some scholars would dis-
agree with Ameringer's view, however, we must remember that
after 1958 the survival of democracy was paramount because
presidents were aware that social and economic reforms could
have lasting impact only if put into effect by solid and
durable institutions.41 This so called Venezuelan demo-
cratic institutionalization was obviously inextricably
linked to oil revenues, for the nation's dependence on oil
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had become so profound that the post-1958 reformist programs
would have been impossible to carry out without oil rev-
enues. A final factor, one that has significantly condi-
tioned Venezuela's foreign policy, is that of U.S. hemi-
spheric domination.
Approach and Methodology
We will begin with the proposition that: foreign pol-
icy is not determined by ideas but by other more tangible
factors. Obviously, this is an abstract proposition and the
study will need to move to a more concrete level. Tenta-
tively then we believe that: Venezuela's foreign policy
during the era of the Betancourt Doctrine and Caldera's Ide-
ological Pluralism was determined by the political and eco-
nomic interests pursued and not by ideology. The main task
will be to demonstrate the relationship between political
economy and ideology, and how, and to what extent, ideology
can be used to justify and/or hide the pursuit of political
and economic interests in making foreign policy.
We will need to establish indicators that will deter-
mine the relationship between variables. Some of these in-
dicators are: the number of countries of ideologically dif-
ferent regimes with which Venezuela suspended relations dur-
ing the era of Betancourt Doctrine; the number of countries
with which Venezuela sustained "aggressive" relations during
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the same period, (the Dominican Republic and Cuba);
Venezuela's political, economic and military support for
democracy in the hemisphere during the period of Betancourt;
policies that ideologically supported the United states po-
sition during Betancourt's period, (support for the Alliance
for Progress). Operationalization will also occur thorough
the number of countries of ideologically different regimes
with which Venezuela renewed relations during the period of
Caldera's Ideological Pluralism; the number of statement
that support Venezuela's commitment to ideological pluralism
and why the Betancourt Doctrine was abandoned; Venezuela's
advocacy of an oil price increase and how this was related
to international social justice.
Analysis will also include a study in terms of
Venezuela's reasons for joining the Andean Common Market in
February, 1973; Venezuela's attempts to control the oil in-
dustry, including Venezuela's initiative to form OPEC; at-
tempts to diversify the economy; attempts to diversify
Venezuela's business partners; attempts to dominate the re-
gion through oil wealth.
The issue of dependency will be treated in terms of
Venezuela's dealings with a dominant power, the United
States. These dealings with the United States will consist
of the following: dealings with the U.S. government, and,
dealings with North American oil corporations. The objec-
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tive then will be to determine whether, and to what extent,
these dealings with a dominant power (United States), influ-
enced or determined the foreign policy of a dependent state,
(Venezuela).
We assert tentatively then that: 1) Betancourt's for-
eign policy was not determined by ideology but by the domi-
nation of the United States in the Western hemisphere, and
by Betancourt's commitment to improve Venezuela's economic
condition as a means for him to remain in power. Also, Be-
tancourt sought to take the best possible advantage of the
dependent situation he was in under U.S. capitalist expan-
sionism. 2) Caldera's commitment to expand Venezuela's re-
gional influence and economic power through wealth, deter-
mined Venezuela's foreign policy during the period of
Caldera's Ideological Pluralism. Also, Caldera's foreign
policy was to a considerable extent determined by the hemi-
spheric economic and political influence of the United
States. Ideology was for Caldera, as well as for Betan-
court, only the means to rationalize their foreign policy
decisions.
It becomes important to note that such concepts as ide-
ology and politics are difficult to measure. For this rea-
son, we use indicators that only relate indirectly to the
concepts they intend to measure. Therefore, the possibility
for error and the limitations of the present study are obvi-
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ous. In other words, it is quite clear that it is difficult
to apply "measurements" to the variables utilized in the
present study, the problem therefore to assess validity and
reliability in this particular study becomes obvious. The
objective of this exercise, then, is to prove or disprove
the tentative assertions mentioned above, and to see to what
extent the findings support or refute some of the assump-
tions of some foreign policy theorists.
Finally, data utilized for this study has been selected
from primary sources, that is, newspapers, interviews, ad-
dresses to the nation, addresses to international confer-
ences and organizations. This technique obviously assumes
that the articulations of individuals are reliable indices
of their actual actions in formulating and carrying out for-
eign policy. The present study also relies on secondary
sources, that is, articles and books relevant for the pur-
pose of this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
VENEZUELA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE
PERIOD OF THE BETANCOURT DOCTRINE
This chapter will attempt to answer the following
questions: Was the Betancourt Doctrine purely ideological
(Betancourt's commitment to democracy in Venezuela and in
the hemisphere)? Was the Betancourt Doctrine just a facade
to justify the pursuit of political and economic interests
or, was it a combination of both, commitment to democracy
and the pursuit of political and economic interests?
The main theme to be developed is that Betancourt's
foreign policy was mainly determined by U.S. hemispheric
domination. Venezuela's foreign policy was determined also
by Betancourt's commitment to improve Venezuela's economic
conditions as a means for him to remain in power. In order
to improve Venezuela's economy and remain in power,
Betancourt sought to enlarge Venezuela's dominance over oil
resources and the oil industry while at the same time he
sought to take the best possible advantage of the dependent
situation he was in under the capitalist expansionism of the
United States. Good economic performance would in turn
ensure the survival of Betancourt's government.
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In an analysis of Venezuela's foreign policy during the
period of the Betancourt Doctrine, the following topics will
be discussed in order to illustrate that policy:
1. Venezuela's foreign policy toward Trujillo's
Dominican Republic.
2. Venezuela's foreign policy toward Castro's Cuba.
3. Venezuela's foreign policy toward the United
States.
4. Venezuela's foreign policy and the economics and
politics of oil: The Case of OPEC.
Venezuela 's foreign policy during the period of the
Betancourt Doctrine (1945-1948 and 1959-1963) cannot be
discussed adequately without briefly exploring the pattern
of that policy prior to 1945. This exercise is important
because it shows that there were significant changes brought
about in the economic and political structures of Venezuela
that had a direct impact on foreign policy.
The most significant change in the economic structure
of Venezuela, was that it changed from a mono-product
economy based on agriculture, to a mono-product economy
based on petroleum. Prior to 1917 Venezuela's economic
welfare depended on coffee and cacao exports. This economic
pattern resulted in delayed and dependent development. In
1917, however, petroleum began to be exploited for
commercial purposes and slowly began to replace agricultural
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products as the main source of revenues. By 1945, the year
Betancourt first came to power, petroleum exports accounted
for 93.4 per cent of Venezuela's exports.' Because the
United States was the major buyer of Venezuela's petroleum,
and because the oil industry was dominated by U.S. oil
corporations, the economy became for the most part dependent
on foreign firms. This economic pattern resulted in outward
oriented development that limited the effectiveness of
Venezuela's political sovereignty.
Venezuela's political structure, on the other hand,
changed from one almost totally dominated by dictatorial
military regimes, to one almost exclusively controlled by
civilian governments after 1945. Between 1908 and 1935 the
dictator Juan V. Gomez had ruled Venezuela as his personal
farm. Gomez personally made large profits from the oil
industry and ruled Venezuela in an uncontested fashion. He
simply exiled or murdered all his political opponents. The
oil industry and the exiling of political enemies, though
initially beneficial to Gomez's dictatorship, in the long
run proved fatal to that type of government. The
scientific, technological and economic benefits brought by
the oil industry, coupled with the generation of exiles who
lived and studied in the United States and Europe, where
they had been exposed to democratic, development-oriented
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government, demanded a new type of government orientation
for Venezuela after 1945, John V. Lombardi states:
"These new people did not subscribe to
the old-fashioned notions of Venezuela
as rural hacienda ... They returned to
help re-create Venezuela's future, they
brought with them sophisticated notions
about investment, production,
industrialization, social welfare and
individual rights ."2
In addition, petroleum revenue greatly enhanced the
possibilities of the new leaders for political changes and
populist reforms.
In summary then changes effected in the economic and
political structure after 1945 showed how the country moved
from delayed and dependent development (1825-1935) to
outward oriented development (1880-1935) and unto state-led
capitalism or the populist era (1945-1948 and 1959-1963).
1. Venezuela's Foreign Policy Toward Trujillo's Dominican
Republic.
The consideration of Trujillo's Dominican Republic is
important because it shows that the Betancourt Doctrine was
applied to dictatorships of the right as well as those of
the left. The main idea here is that Betancourt applied to
Trujillo the Betancourt Doctrine because Betancourt was
committed to remain in power, and he feared to be overthrown
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by Trujillo - like opposition, namely, military men.
Economic problems and the Cold War also contributed to
Betancourt's application of his doctrine to Trujillo.
Finally, the protection and promotion of Venezuela's oil
interests led Betancourt to play the anti-dictatorship game
through the Betancourt Doctrine.
The Betancourt Doctrine simply stated is: that no
government that was not democratically elected, that
achieved power by forceful means and furthermore, that was
not representative of the will of the people, deserved
recognition of the American states. Accordingly, Venezuela
abstained from relations with any such dictatorial
governments and sought their expulsion from the Organization
of American States. The Betancourt Doctrine sought to
discourage coups against democratically established
governments, meaning that it tried to function as a
deterrent to the rise of dictatorships.
Through the Betancourt Doctrine, Betancourt sought to
convince the American republics, especially the United
States to abstain from recognizing dictatorial governments.
Betancourt feared that, if this were not the case, his
government could be toppled by the military at any time.
The issue of the United States recognition became crucial to
Betancourt if dictatorships were going to be discouraged and
isolated. This reflects the influence of the United States
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on Betancourt's foreign policy. From Washington's point of
view there were, however, some factors that did not at all
coincide with Betancourt's goal.
First of all, it must be remembered that during the
1940's Trujillo and the United States had good relations.
During that period Trujillo was strongly criticized by the
Latin American left. Obviously, this was a favorable point
for Trujillo in the context of his relations with the United
States. In addition, it was during this period that the
Superpowers began to fight the Cold War and Latin America
was not exempt. The United States feared the spread of
communism in Latin America and considered that dictators of
the right were the best way to combat that ideology. Paul
S. Holbo argues that after the end of World War II, when
most Latin American countries were ruled by authoritarian
governments, the Latin American democrats, whose power had
been usurped or denied, hoped in vain that the United States
would help to depose the despotic regimes because "the Cold
War underlayed dealings with dictators. "3 In addition,
Larman C. Wilson states that in order to maintain good
relations with the United States, all that Trujillo,
Duvalier and other dictators of America needed to do was to
play the "anti-communist game."4
Secondly, Betancourt himself may have complicated his
problems, and he lacked U.S. support when he most needed it.
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Betancourt's 1945-1948 populist reforms may have been
perceived as too radical in the United States, and as a
result, this U.S. perception, or misperception, may have
indirectly contributed to the overthrow of A.D. (Acci6n
Democratica) in 1948. In Venezuela: Oil and Politics,
Betancourt argues that while Perez Jimenez and other major
military leaders were planning to topple AD's government,
the United States proceeded to recognize the de facto
government of General Manuel Odria in Peru. This action by
the U.S., Betancourt argues, stimulated the Venezuelan
plotters to carry out their illegal usurpation of power. As
Betancourt himself puts it:
"The victorious insubordination of Odria
in Lima accelerated the plans of those
disturbers of order ... the Washington
government recognized the de facto
regime of Odria ... the result of a
military coup ... the Caracas
conspirators took this attitude of the
United Statgs as a 'green light for an
uprising'."
Again, Betancourt sought to protect his government by
applying the Betancourt Doctrine to Trujillo and all
dictators in the hemisphere. Failure to get the United
States to withhold recognition from such regimes contributed
to the deposition of the AD of Betancourt in 1948. The
United States was obviously more concerned with the advance
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of Communism than with protecting Betancourt's interests in
Venezuela. Betancourt's relationship with Trujillo in 1945-
1948 was indeed conditioned by a major pragmatic political
factor, namely that Betancourt saw his preservation of power
threatened by Trujillo and Trujillo - like governments.
In 1959, after ten years of the Perez Jimenez military
dictatorship, Betancourt regained power in Venezuela, and he
immediately recalled the Betancourt Doctrine as a hallmark
of Venezuelan foreign policy. Some extremely important
events took place that led to his election and these should
be mentioned. The most important one is that Betancourt
himself took part in a coalition movement that overthrew
Perez Jimenez and governed the country for the next five
years. The formation of the Punto Fijo Pact, the political
coalition between AD, COPEI (Comit6 de Organizaci6n Politica
Electoral Independiente) and URD (Union Republicana
Democratica) was one of the most important events that led
to Betancourt's election. Without this coalition,
Betancourt would not have been reelected Venezuela's
president. It is important also to note that economic and
political forces returned to power the same populist party
that had been overthrown in 1948, namely, Betancourt's
Accion Democrdtica.
In order to explain how the aforementioned factors
contributed to Betancourt's return to power, it is necessary
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to understand the repercussive effect of certain events in
the Latin American republics. As stated by Harry Kantor:
"Although ... independent of one another what happens in any
one [Latin American republic] influences what happens in the
other." 6  Betancourt's own previous experience ten years
earlier (1945-1948) proved Kantor's argument correct. The
overthrow of AD in 1948 was, to a considerable extent,
motivated by the wave of coups that was sweeping the region.
By 1959, events in other Latin American countries again
influenced Venezuela, but this time to Betancourt's benefit.
In order to depose dictatorial governments, political
coalitions were formed in several Latin American countries
besides Venezuela, as for example the coalition between
liberals and conservatives in Colombia.
Venezuela was then impacted by such events going on in
other Latin American countries, and in 1958 a coalition was
formed in Venezuela, the Punto Fijo Pact. According to the
Pact of Punto Fijo AD, COPEI and URD agreed to: "abide by
election results, uphold the constitution and to share
cabinet positions." This coalition proved to be a crucial
step to ensure the continuation of the politics of
democratic government in Venezuela.
Another important factor that led to the election of
Betancourt was the influence of AD's populism. The people,
dissatisfied with the politics of Perez Jimenez's
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dictatorship, sent to the presidency the same populist
reformist party that had been overthrown ten years earlier.
In this, as Judith Ewell writes, AD had a second chance at
implementing its populist programs:
"Popular history according to Accion
Democratica frequently stresses the
continuity of objectives and programs
between the Trienio [1945-1948] ard the
Betancourt government of 1959-63."
With Betancourt's and AD's populist reforms, there was
a turn from Perez Jimenez's "laissez faire," outward
oriented development, to Betancourt's state-led capitalism
and social justice.
Betancourt hoped populism would this time prevail in
Venezuela. He also hoped that by bringing out the
Betancourt Doctrine against Trujillo and the remaining dic-
tatorships, he would isolate them and eventually encourage
the rise of populist governments similar to his own in the
hemisphere. He seemed to acknowledge that his government's
survival depended on the emergence of kindred systems in the
region. As noted by Robert J. Alexander: "A steady drift
towards military dictatorship elsewhere in Latin America ...
might seriously impair the Venezuelan regime." 9
Another important factor that determined Venezuela's
foreign policy toward Trujillo's Dominican Republic was that
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Betancourt faced serious economic problems and he was
desirous to show the United States that he was not a
communist, as some in the United States had perceived him in
his previous 1945-1948 populist reforms. Betancourt also
needed to show the United States that he was a better
alternative to oppose communism than dictators of the right.
That is why in 1959, in the midst of the Cold War,
Betancourt did not only recall and apply the Betancourt
Doctrine, but added a new element to it, namely, that right
wing dictators had to be isolated because they engendered
communism. Betancourt himself said that "the challenge
before us is ... to thwart the prosperity of governments not
elected by the people, because they engender communism. "10
This simply underlines how Betancourt was trying to turn
against Latin American dictatorships and play the anti-
communist game that brought so many benefits from the United
States. In order to support his claims against
dictatorships, Betancourt argued that the communists in
Venezuela dominated labor unions and held government
positions during the period of Perez Jimenez dictatorship,
something, according to Betancourt, that never took place
during his previous 1945-1948 government.l
Betancourt was fortunate that by the beginning of the
1960's the United States was not giving all-out support to
the Dominican dictator. Trujillo had refused to collaborate
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with the U.S. government against Castro's Cuba, and this
refusal brought about a deterioration in U.S.-Trujillo
relations. Betancourt, quite to the contrary, sought the
economic and political benefits of cooperating with the
United States against Castro.1 2  United States' political
and economic support was vital for Betancourt to remain in
power and for AD's government to survive. Government
survival indeed depended in large measure on the success of
Betancourt's economic reforms, and successful economic
reforms needed large sums of money, and the U.S. was the
most accessible source for that money.
In this context of Betancourt's need for good relations
with the United States, it is necessary to understand that
Venezuela's economic welfare depended upon oil and upon a
mostly American controlled oil industry. Venezuela's oil
revenues were indeed heavily conditioned by American oil
companies operating in Venezuela, and by the fact that the
United States was the number one customer for Venezuela's
crude. Thus, through the Betancourt Doctrine, Venezuela
began to play the anti-communist game in order that it might
not lose its most favorable position in the U.S. market.
This was not unfounded because, as Enrique Baloyra notes,
upon Betancourt's return to power his regime was pressured
by a series of "momentous events" that prompted fear and a
response by the Venezuelan government. Among the events,
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Baloyra writes, was that on March 10, 1959, when "President
Eisenhower issued a proclamation establishing mandatory
control of oil imports to the U.S." 1 3  This further
complicated Betancourt's economic problems and reflects the
failure of the Betancourt Doctrine in getting the most
favorable conditions for Venezuela's oil in the U.S.'
market.
In the end, Venezuela's foreign policy toward
Trujillo's Dominican Republic was one marked by animosity
between Betancourt and Trujillo. It was not, however, this
animosity that led Betancourt to apply the Betancourt
Doctrine to Trujillo, but it was rather Betancourt's fear
that a Trujillo-like military man might topple the AD
government. In addition to the problem of fear of being
overthrown, there were also economic problems urging
Betancourt to apply his doctrine to right as well as left
wing dictatorships in order to procure United States
economic favors. Finally, seeking to flatter the U.S.
government, Betancourt stressed his doctrine against
Trujillo, especially after Trujillo's impasse with the
United States when he refused to cooperate with Washington
against Castro's Cuba.
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2. Venezuela Foreign Policy Toward Castro's Cuba
Castro's Cuba is an important topic in terms of the
present study because it shows how the protection of the
United States' security interests in the hemisphere
conditioned the foreign policy of Betancourt. It will be
argued that while Betancourt may have played his cards
right, meaning that for whatever interests he was committed
to remain on the side of the U.S. rather than on Castro's,
the main factor determining his foreign policy toward
Castro's Cuba, had to do with U.S. pressure. It will also
be argued that Betancourt's and Castro's divergent views
regarding the U.S. came as a consequence of Betancourt's
political pragmatism more than adherence to any ideological
position or any anti-dictatorial doctrine.
In order to understand how responsible the United
States was for Betancourt's foreign policy toward Castro, it
must be pointed out that the United States was the major
single purchaser of Venezuela's oil, and Venezuela was one
of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign investments.
Also, Venezuela's economic recovery and Betancourt's
political survival depended on U.S. economic aid and U.S.
capitalist expansion.
The first part of the argument has to do with U.S.
pressure on Betancourt. U.S. pressure showed in economic
and political ways. The United States was well aware that
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for Betancourt to remain in power, the inflow of U.S.
capital was vital. That is why it is not difficult to
explain why Betancourt's AD, a populist oriented party,
opened up the doors to U.S. capitalist expansion.
Betancourt knew that the survival of his government depended
on the protection and promotion of U.S. economic interests
in Venezuela, and that U.S. capitalist expansion was crucial
for his political survival. Carlos Capriles Ayala, argues
that after Betancourt took power, Venezuela's front gate
became wide-open to foreign capitalism which penetrated the
country and expanded spectacularly.14 Daniel Hellinger
states that "AD policies were ... consistent with the
interests of expanding transnational capital. "15 Some
apologists argue that opening up the doors to foreign
capital was a necessary measure since Venezuela was so
dependent on oil, and the economy had to be diversified. 1 6
The true reason for AD's attitude toward U.S. capitalist
expansion, however, was that Betancourt saw that the
survival of AD's government depended, in large measure, on
U.S. capital inflow. It is no wonder that, as Steven Ellner
says, "Betancourt attempted to make a showcase of his ...
enterprises in order to reduce prejudice against foreign
investment." 17 (Table 1 shows the level of U.S. investment
in Venezuela during the Betancourt period.)
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Table 1
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN VENEZUELA
1959 TO 1963
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
Transport
Communication
and
Year Total Petroleum Manufacturing Utilities Trade
1959 2,690 2,046 161 29 166
1960 2,569 1,995 180 32 165
1961 3,007 2,368 195 34 185
1962 2,816 2,197 193 35 175
1963 2,808 2,166 202 36 185
Source: James W. Wilkie and Adam Perkal, Eds.,
Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Volume
24 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center
Publications, University of California,
1985), p. 669.
The dependency of Betancourt on U.S. capital expansion
can be better stated in terms of Cardoso and Faletto's
framework. Accordingly, U.S. capital kept the Betancourt
government alive through the inflow of money destined to
reach the dominant classes in Venezuela. In this process of
capital transfer, the Venezuelan state, headed by
Betancourt, served as a mediator between U.S. capital and
the Venezuelan dominant classes. As stated by Cardoso and
Faletto:
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"During this process the role of the
state augments ... in effect ... the
state ... acts as mediator for the
politics of$ financing foreign
investments. "
This situation, then, created a condition of dependency
from which Betancourt could not escape. Again, Cardoso and
Faletto state:
"Dependency finds ... a specific type of
relation ... that implies a situation of
dominion that leads to a link with the
exterior.
Cardoso and Faletto furthermore mention that with the
injection of foreign capital into the dependent country's
economy, there develop "consequences evidently restrictive
as to the autonomy of the national economic system and
political decisions. "20
Also, it is important to note that U.S. pressure on
Betancourt which influenced his foreign policy toward Castro
had much to do with the fact that Venezuela's oil was
strategically important to the United States (Venezuela
provided most of the oil coming into the United States).
The United States could not afford to lose oil-rich
Venezuela to Communism. Therefore, in order to protect
economic and security interests, the United States was urged
to pressure Betancourt, so that Betancourt would maintain a
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strong stand against Castro. Commonweal's March 8, 1963
issue voiced the importance of Venezuela's mineral riches to
the United States, "[Venezuela's] vast oil and iron
resources are of key importance to the West. "2 1 Samuel
Shapiro expresses also this U.S. concern over Venezuela, "a
crucial test of our policies will come in Venezuela, Cuba's
Caribbean neighbor ... "22
From the foregoing it can be seen that the United
States was pursuing its interests in Venezuela because oil
was a vital element for American industrialized society and
because the American oil industry had much at stake in
Venezuela. It is no wonder then that the oil industry
worked in partnership with the AD government. Cooperation
was in the industry's own economic interests, and in those
of the United States.
The second aspect of the discussion has to do with
Betancourt's political pragmatism. It can be argued that
while subject to U.S. pressure and dependence on the U.S.,
Betancourt played his cards right, meaning that by remaining
on the side of the U.S., rather than on Castro's, Betancourt
derived the most political and economic benefits.
Betancourt's and Castro's divergent views regarding the U.S.
will illustrate the aforementioned assertion.
Fidel Castro visited Venezuela immediately after taking
over the government in Cuba, January 23, 1959. The primary
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objective for his visit was to thank the Venezuelan people
for the support given to the Cuban revolutionaries of the
Sierra Maestra during their fight against Batista. However,
as Castro's speeches in Venezuela reflect, rather than
thanking the Venezuelan people, Castro launched an
unrelenting attack against the United States. He spoke with
frenzy, and accused the U.S. of being imperialist. In his
two days' visit to Venezuela, Castro stirred the masses,
especially those belonging to the Venezuelan Communist
party, and before his departure for Cuba, he had an
interview with Betancourt.
In that interview, according to Betancourt, Castro
asked him a $300 million loan to free Cuba from dependence
on the United States, and to stir up trouble for the
American government. Betancourt replied that Venezuela was
not in a position to make such a loan. That apparently
disgusted Castro and he left Venezuela in anger. 2 3
That interview was the beginning of the animosity
between Castro and Betancourt. It shows, however, the
pragmatism of Betancourt because, if Betancourt had played
Castro's trick on the United States, the U.S. economic and
political reprisal against Betancourt could have been
devastating to his government.
The potential existed, then, for inflicting damage on
Venezuela. The United States had already imposed mandatory
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control of oil imports to the U.S. As a result of the U.S.
government proclamation on imported oil, Venezuela suffered
considerably. It was indeed a difficult time for the
Venezuelan government because import quotas limited large
increases in production and consequently, oil revenues
declined.2 4 Oil, as C.A. Hauberg puts it, "was the mainstay
for the [Venezuelan] economy and consequently the budget was
in bad shape." 2 5  A further cut imposed on Venezuela's oil
quota to the U.S., in reprisal for having followed Castro's
request in regard to the U.S., could have been disastrous to
Betancourt's government. Thus, Betancourt chose to gain
Castro's enmity, rather than to bring upon his government
and upon him personally any reprisal by the United States.
The Alliance for Progress is another factor that
influenced the pragmatist, Betancourt, and his foreign
policy as he tried to make the best of the situation while
under pressure from the United States. According to Robert
F. Aide, the rationale behind the Alliance for Progress was
to prevent communist intrusion in the Western Hemisphere.
Due to precarious economic and social conditions in Latin
America, the people could be extremely susceptible to
communist-inspired revolutions of the Cuban type. 26 Through
the Alliance for Progress, the economic and social
conditions of the Latin Americans could be improved, thus
diminishing the risk for Communist intrusion.
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In Venezuela, too, the stated goal was to make the
Alliance successful in order to diminish the appeal of
Castro's radical revolutionary model. Betancourt became
resolutely committed to extract maximum economic and
political benefits from the U.S. because he knew that the
U.S. was particularly interested in Venezuela. Venezuela
supplied a considerable part of the Western hemisphere's oil
including a vital part of the U.S. supply. As can be seen
in Table 2, the level of U.S. government foreign aid to
Venezuela tends to increase with each year that Betancourt
was in power.
Table 2
U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN GRANTS
AND CREDITS TO VENEZUELA
1959 TO 1963
[in millions of dollars]
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
3 6 32 64 43
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial
Times to 1970, September 1975, pp. 873-875.
In conclusion foreign policy toward Castro's Cuba was
primarily conditioned by the U.S. display of economic and
political power in protecting its security interests in the
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hemisphere. U.S. pressure upon Betancourt urged him to
remain an all-out supporter of United States anti-Castro
policies. That is why Betancourt unrelentingly applied the
Betancourt Doctrine to Castro's Cuba. It is important to
note again that while he was no doubt pressured by the U.S.,
Betancourt's political pragmatism allowed him to take
advantage of a difficult situation. That is why his
commitment to apply the Betancourt Doctrine to Castro can
also be explained in terms of the U.S.'s urgency in
protecting economic and security interests in Venezuela.
Betancourt elicited substantial amounts of Alliance for
Progress funds in order to carry out successful economic and
social reforms that would maintain the AD party and himself
in power.
3. Venezuela's Foreign Policy Toward the United States
Betancourt's foreign policy toward the United States
was primarily conditioned by the globalization of U.S.
capital expansion and by Betancourt's economic problems.
With the approval of the U.S. government, Betancourt imposed
higher taxes on American oil companies operating in
Venezuela in order to consolidate his power. Moreover, as
already suggested, the United States used the Alliance for
Progress to protect and promote security interests in the
hemisphere, particularly in Venezuela, and took political
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advantage of Betancourt by letting him use substantial
amounts of Alliance for Progress funds.
The beginning of the 1960's were difficult years for
the world economy. A world-wide economic recession affected
all, and Venezuela's economy, completely dependent on oil,
was particularly impacted because of the drop in the price
of oil. This complication of the economic situation, in
turn, seriously threatened the *political survival of
Betancourt's government. The United States, on the other
hand, took advantage of Betancourt's economic and political
problems to further expansion in Venezuela by increasing
U.S. investments and foreign grants and credits to that
country. Samuel Shapiro notes that during this time, 1961-
1962, the Venezuelan budget had a $250 million deficit
despite Betancourt's previous $200 million loan from fifteen
U.S. banks just one year before.2 7  This difficult economic
situation led Betancourt to look again for U.S. foreign
assistance. Table 3 shows the increase in U.S. total
investments in Venezuela during the period of Betancourt
(1959-1963), in relation to the 1950-1956 period. In
addition, Table 4 reflects the increase in U.S. foreign
grants and credits to Venezuela during the Betancourt
period, in relation to the previous nine years.
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Table 3
U.S. DIRECT TOTAL INVESTMENT IN
VENEZUELA
1950-1956 AND 1959-1963
[In millions of U.S. Dollars]
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
(993) (968) (1,134) (1,237) (1,275) (1,311) (1,676)
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
(2,690) (2,569) (3,007) (2,816) (2,808)
Source: James W. Wilkie and Adam Perkal, Eds.
Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Volume
24 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center
Publications, University of California,
1985), pp. 668-669.
Table 4
U.S. FOREIGN AID TO VENEZUELA IN GRANTS
AND CREDITS
1950-1956 AND 1959-1963
[In millions of U.S. Dollars]
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
(Z) (1) (4) (Z) (-3) (Z) (-3)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
(-1) (-1) (3) (6) (32) (64) (43)
- Represents zero
Z less than $500,000.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical
Statistics of the United States. Colonial
Times to 1970, September 1975, pp. 873-875.
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Indeed, there seems to be a direct correlation between
Betancourt's economic problems, his need to overcome the
economic crisis as a means to maintain the AD party and
himself in power, and U.S. capital expansion in the form of
foreign investments and foreign grants and credits. Tables
3 and 4 portray the rise of U.S. foreign investment and
foreign aid to Venezuela and may be interpreted as a measure
of the relative importance of U.S. capitalist expansion in
conditioning Betancourt's foreign and domestic policies.
The second point of the argument is that Betancourt
used Venezuela's oil to consolidate his position in power.
Betancourt did not do this autonomously, however, because he
had to have the approval of Washington in order to impose
higher taxes on American oil companies in Venezuela. For AD
to remain in power, it had to carry out successfully
agrarian, economic and social reforms, and consequently, a
new source of revenues had to be created. As oil was the
Venezuelan economy's mainstay, AD thought it convenient to
impose higher taxes on American oil corporations in order to
acquire the necessary extra revenue that the government
needed. As stated by Loring Allen, "the [AD] government
needed revenues desperately to support its reforms ... The
petroleum industry was the only source." 2 8
In support of the foregoing argument, Hellinger asserts
that AD's leaders decided to speed up the land reform
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program in order to prevent a suspected military coup.2 9
Land reform programs, however, had to proceed on the basis
of compensated expropriations if the government was to avoid
the worst consequences of an outraged landowning class. The
government, then, was so preoccupied with keeping power that
it rushed to carry out reforms at the expense of imposing
higher taxes on American oil companies. Alexander states
that the AD government,
"sought to establish firm control over
the country's principal source of income
... [and] it sought to use this
increased income ... to etablish the
basis for ... government."3
It is worth emphasizing that the Betancourt
government's initiative to increase taxes on American oil
companies was an agreement that had to be approved by the
U.S. government. Accordingly, the oil companies were then
permitted to charge this tax against their profits at home,
which explains why the U.S. companies did not lose. This
clearly reflects the extent to which U.S. capital expansion
and U.S. pressure, conditioned the foreign and domestic
policies of Betancourt's government.
The final point of the foregoing discussion is that the
United States, in order to pursue security interests in the
hemisphere, took political advantage of Betancourt by
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letting him use substantial amounts of Alliance for Progress
funds. Even though other nations, Bolivia, the Dominican
Republic, Chile, etc., received more Alliance aid per capita
than Venezuela, because of its civilian form of government
and its oil wealth, Venezuela came to be one of the main
showcases for the Alliance.
William C. Olson argues that one of the most striking
examples of the role political and economic interests can
play in determining foreign policy, is that developed by the
United States during the Cold War:
"As the Cold War developed and the
United States found itself engaged in a
struggle with the Soviet Union for
influence in the Third World, a far more
elaborate use of economic assistance as
a weapon of foreign policy began to be
deployed.'
Castro's turn to the Soviet Union was the major factor
that awakened U.S. interest in the region. This point was
implicitly conveyed in President Kennedy's speech when he
visited Venezuela in December 16, 1961:
"[This is] an Alliance for the
protection of our countries ... one of
the main objectives ought to be ... the
elimination of tyranny."32
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Kalman H. Silvert states that "the United States
interpreted a communized Cuba as a threat above all else to
national security ... "33 Silvert's argument coincides with
Venezuelan Jose A. Silva Michelena:
"It had become clear to the United
States that economic development ... of
Latin America was a vil need for its
own internal security."
This United States' attitude toward Latin America,
then, proves correct Robert F. Aide's argument that the
United States takes an active interest in Latin America only
when it perceives a direct threat to its own security or
economic interests.35
From the above, it could be therefore argued that
Venezuela was one of the countries where the United States
took most active interest in preserving its own security.
It appears, then, that Venezuela, for its oil wealth, and
its civilian government, was one of the most appropriate
places to make the Alliance work. Referring to Venezuela,
Shapiro argues that, "if... reforms do not work here, they
are not likely to be successful in less richly endowed Latin
American states." 36 Also, Kennedy himself declared in his
speech on the occasion of his visit to Venezuela, "here in
Venezuela the true meaning of the new Alliance for Progress
is manifested."3 7 Kennedy hoped that if the Alliance could
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work in Venezuela, it would inspire faith in other countries
that the same miracle could work for them, thus diminishing
their desire to experiment with Castro's model. Table 5
shows that Venezuela had the highest rate of growth of per
capita income in Latin America for the period of the
Alliance, 1961-1965. There can be then some correlation
between Venezuela's appropriateness for the Alliance,
foreign aid received and improvements in the rate of growth.
This is not to deny that there were five other countries
that ranked higher than Venezuela in the amount of Alliance
for Progress funds received.
Table 5
THE AVERAGE RATE OF GROWTH OF PER CAPITA INCOME
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1961-1965
Argentina -0.1
Bolivia 2.0
Brazil 0.2
Chile 1.7
Colombia 1.6
Ecuador 1.4
Mexico 3.4
Panama 3.9
Uruguay 
-1.4
Venezuela 4.2
Source: Cole Blasier ed., Contemporary Change in
Latin America, (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1968) pp. 134.
In conclusion, it appears clear that Venezuela's
foreign policy toward the United States during the period of
the Betancourt Doctrine was indeed primarily conditioned by
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U.S. capitalist expansion and Betancourt's economic.
problems. Accordingly, the United States took advantage of
Betancourt's economic problems to promote U.S. capital
penetration in Venezuela. Betancourt needed desperately to
overcome an economic crisis in order to maintain his hold on
the government. The United States, then, provided him with
the means to stay in power, by increasing foreign
investments and foreign grants and credits to Venezuela.
Also, Betancourt's oil policies were geared toward
maintaining a balance between economic prosperity and
political survival. In order to keep power, Betancourt had
to carry out successful economic reforms; to do that, a new
source of revenue was needed, and American oil companies
became the source. Regrettably, Betancourt had to first
have U.S. government approval in order to impose a new tax
on American oil companies operating in Venezuela. Finally,
Betancourt believed he was gaining substantial economic
benefits from the United States' Alliance for Progress, but
in fact, as Venezuela's social scientist Silva Michelena
argues, "they were... helping to reaffirm dependency and
defend U.S. internal security and other interests." 3 8
60
4. Venezuela's Foreign Policy and the Economics and
Politics of Oil: The Case of OPEC
A complete analysis of the politics and economics of
Venezuelan oil is clearly beyond the scope of this study. I
can, however, attempt to demonstrate the intertwining of the
economics of oil and politics. The main argument is that
United States capitalist expansion, coupled with a drop in
the price of oil, pushed Betancourt to seek alliance with
other oil producing countries in the Middle East, in order
to get a fairer return for Venezuela's oil resources. It
can also be said that in seeking to participate in OPEC
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), Betancourt
may have overlooked the Betancourt Doctrine, meaning that he
collaborated with non-democratic governments, but in fact
Betancourt was adhering to, and going along with populist
logic.
Central to the understanding of Venezuela is the close
link between politics and oil. Oil wealth, political
stability, and progress are inextricably related. Martz and
Myers tend to agree:
"Venezuelan political elites [have] the
... conviction that properly used
petroleum wealth holds the key to
national control over the economy, 30
progress... to economic development.'
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In his 1959-1963 period, Betancourt, too, acknowledged
that oil, economic development and political stability, were
inseparably related. He saw very clearly that the survival
of his government, and the political survival of A.D. and
himself, were heavily dependent on oil revenues. However,
to Betancourt's disadvantage, United States pressure and
other economic problems seriously impaired Venezuela's
economy. Romero argues that Betancourt's government had
serious economic problems and "found itself between the
threat of slow economic growth, and social pressure for a
better income distribution." 4 0
Internationally there were events that further
complicated Betancourt's problems at home. President
Eisenhower had imposed a mandatory control on oil imports to
the United States. This unilateral measure taken in 1959,
clearly reflects the dominant nature of the U.S. capitalist
expansion. In this case, cuts were imposed on Venezuela's
oil quota without any regard for the serious damage they
would inflict to Venezuela's oil revenues, and consequently,
to Venezuela's economy. The following year, 1960, the
Betancourt government faced a new problem, overproduction in
the world oil had caused a glut, the price of oil fell and
consequently, Venezuela's oil revenues further declined.
All this resulted in a $150 million reduction in annual
income for Betancourt's government. 41 This economic crisis,
62
which had been prompted in large measure by the United
States, forced Betancourt not only to use a $200 million
loan he had just negotiated with U.S. banks, but also to
begin looking for more money from the United States in order
to overcome the crisis and run his government's programs,
all a reaffirmation of Venezuelan dependence on the United
States.
Regarding the decline in world oil prices, it is
important to make brief reference to "posted pricing," and
how it affected Venezuela. Posted pricing refers to the
price the oil companies fixed for oil in the international
market. Before the world oversupply of oil became evident,
posted pricing was relatively high, and as a consequence,
Venezuela was able to get a larger share of the oil income.
After the oil glut, however, the oil companies no longer
control posted pricing, so prices dropped and Venezuela's
income was drastically reduced. The result was that the
country was caught in an economic crisis which compelled
Betancourt to seek negotiations with fellow oil producing
nations in the Middle East. The purpose was to form an
international oil organization that would regulate world oil
production and thus prevent the posted price of oil from
falling.
From the above, it is clear that the U.S. capitalist
expansion and the oversupply of oil in the world,
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inadvertently stimulated Venezuela's initiative to form an
international organization that would allow Venezuela to get
a fairer share for its oil resource. That is indeed one of
the factors that explain OPEC's birth.
It could be argued that in seeking to form OPEC,
Betancourt may have overlooked the Betancourt Doctrine as he
engaged in negotiations and mutual collaboration with non-
democratic governments in the Middle East. It must be
remembered, however, that the Betancourt Doctrine
exclusively applied to non-democratic or dictatorial regimes
in the Western Hemisphere. Those were regimes that, by
reason of their ideological differences and geographical
proximity could threaten Betancourt's government. In the
end, Betancourt's actions may have contradicted the
Betancourt Doctrine, but he was adhering to populist logic
in wanting to participate in OPEC.
The point here, therefore, is that OPEC really goes
along with Betancourt's and AD's populist logic. One of the
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main traits of populism is that of social justice.
Accordingly, social justice is called for in those
situations in which one class, for reasons of material
wealth or status unfairly dominates or exploits another.
Thus, in order to remedy this unfair condition, the
oppressed class unites in a common effort to demand, through
social justice, better treatment from the dominant class.
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Transferring this idea to the international area, it becomes
obvious that to Betancourt, there were unequal conditions
governing relations between underdeveloped oil producing
nations, and developed oil consuming states. Through OPEC
therefore, the underdeveloped oil producing nations could
somewhat level up the relationship, by extracting greater
benefits from their resources, and by imposing greater
duties on the wealthier states. Betancourt's own words
illustrate the foregoing argument:
"The defense of the prices for the raw
material we produce is an historical
exigency... [OPEC] if properly oriented,
should be a new example of the politics
of international cooperation."4 3
Another major trait of populism, one that also reflects
the populist nature of OPEC is that the state takes control
over a country's natural resources. According to populist
logic, the state is responsible for centralized planning,
and for channeling a country's human and natural resources
as a means of bringing about the economic transformation and
progress of nations. Betancourt therefore believed OPEC to
be a means for channeling Venezuela's and the OPEC
countries' oil resources and, through a concerted effort,
increase oil revenues for the greater benefit of their
people. As Betancourt himself stated:
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"We are united by the common interest of
unifying efforts and joining the will to
extract the black juice from our soils
for th greater benefit of our
people." 
Thus, through OPEC, Betancourt sought to improve
Venezuela's economic relations with industrialized
countries, especially, the United States. He furthermore
tried to establish a more direct and equal relationship, as
Hellinger states, a "special relationship," between his
government and the United States. 4 5
CONCLUSION
An analysis of Venezuela's foreign policy during the
period of the Betancourt Doctrine has demonstrated that
foreign policy was determined by U.S. pressure as well as by
Betancourt's desire to protect his position and power rather
than by any inexorable adherence to an ideology. Betancourt
needed good relations with the United States because
Venezuela's economic welfare depended upon oil and upon a
mostly American controlled oil industry. Also, U.S.
pressure on Betancourt urged him to remain an all-out
supporter of United States anti-Castro policies. Betancourt
needed desperately to overcome an economic crisis to
maintain his hold on the government. The United States,
then, provided him with the means to stay in power, by
increasing foreign investments and foreign grants and
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credits to Venezuela. Finally, the combination of U.S.
capitalist expansion and Venezuela's domestic economic
problems, forced Betancourt to seek negotiations and
collaboration with countries in the Arab World to form an
organization that would control oil production and allow its
members to gain greater benefits from their oil resource.
This initiative to participate in OPEC was the result of
Betancourt's and AD's populist logic.
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CHAPTER III
VENEZUELA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE
PERIOD OF CALDERA'S IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the foreign pol-
icy of Rafael Caldera's administration (1969-1974) can be
explained in terms of Venezuela's pursuit of domestic and
regional economic goals. It will be argued that the Chris-
tian Democrats' major tenets, Ideological Pluralism and In-
ternational Social Justice had only minimal impact in deter-
mining Venezuela's foreign policy and that foreign policy
goals were really driven by the desire to expand the coun-
try's economic power and regional influence. This chapter
seeks also to demonstrate that Caldera's foreign policy was
to a considerable extent determined by the economic and po-
litical influence of the United States in the hemisphere.
Caldera's COPEI was popularly elected to power in 1969
in large measure as a consequence of the coalition pact
formed with Acci6n Democratica (AD) and Uni6n Republicana
Democrdtica (URD) ten years earlier. According to the terms
of the pact the three parties agreed to abide by election
results, uphold the Constitution and to share cabinet posi-
tions. The main objective of the Punto Fijo Pact (1958) was
to strengthen the civilian democratic government that was
going to take over a country that had historically been
ruled by military dictatorships of the right. Thus, after
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winning the elections, the Betancourt government proceeded
to share cabinet positions, demonstrated by the fact that
nine of the fifteen cabinet positions were equally divided
between AD, COPEI, and URD, and the remaining six were occu-
pied by independents. This pact was crucial in strengthen-
ing the democratic trend that would allow COPEI to assume
the presidency of Venezuela ten years later.
Ideological Pluralism and International Social Justice
became the hallmark of Caldera's foreign policy, thus pro-
viding an opportunity to observe the relative importance of
ideology in determining the actions of Christian Democrats.
Ideological Pluralism emphasizes unity among the Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean nations regardless of ideological differ-
ences, or as Caldera himself calls it, "unity within diver-
sity."1  Eduardo Frei Montalva (Chile's former president
1964-1970), referring to the pluralistic nature of Christian
Democracy, stated that it stands neither to the right nor to
the left, but with the people in their struggle for jus-
tice.2
International Social Justice, on the other hand, calls
for the rich and developed nations of the world to assist,
through a sharing of their material and intellectual wealth,
in the development of poor states. This International So-
cial Justice must be compatible with:
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"... principles of cooperation, free ac-
cess to the sources of wealth ... and
the application of the principles ...
that imply the defense of the weakest in
international economic relations."3
Taken in the context of Venezuela's relations with other
countries, especially those of the industrialized world,
this principle implies that Venezuela must struggle to at-
tain fair prices for its primary products.
In order to delve deeper into the analysis of Caldera's
foreign policy the following questions must be addressed:
Does a shift occur in Venezuela's foreign policy after 1969,
and if so, what prompts it? How do developments in the do-
mestic and international environment interact and/or influ-
ence Venezuela's foreign policy? Was it adherence to
COPEI's ideology that determined Caldera's foreign policy or
was it pure pragmatic considerations?
During the decade prior to Caldera coming to power,
Venezuela's foreign policy was dominated by the Betancourt
Doctrine. In conformity with that doctrine, Venezuela de-
nied recognition to dictatorial regimes and in general to
regimes established by force. There were many factors in-
fluencing Venezuela's promulgation of the Betancourt Doc-
trine; among them, was a fear that rebellious groups as-
sisted from the outside might endanger the survival of Be-
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tancourt's government. Cuba's shift toward Communism fur-
ther complicated Venezuela's problems because now the threat
was not only to Venezuela's political system but to its cap-
italist economic system as well. Thus, considerations about
the security of Betancourt's government, economic interests
and others, forced the Venezuelan president to apply the Be-
tancourt Doctrine and to adopt an uncompromising position
toward the few dictatorships in the region. The purpose was
to subject dictatorships to economic and political isolation
in order to discourage their growth.
When Caldera came to power in 1969 the reality of the
regional environment had changed. Practical considerations
led him to relinquish the Betancourt Doctrine and adopt a
position that could allow him to deal more effectively with
the new conditions in the region. The following factors may
help explain the shift in Venezuelan foreign policy after
1969.
1. Predominance of Dictatorial Regimes in the Region
There was indeed a change in regime types in Latin
America and this was one of the factors that prompted
Caldera to chart a new course for the foreign policy of
Venezuela. When Betancourt was in power and the Betancourt
Doctrine was applied, there was a wave of civilian liberal
democratic regimes in the hemisphere; therefore, Venezuela
could afford to suspend relations with the few existent dic-
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tatorships in the region. By the time Caldera attained
power, however, most of Latin America was ruled by dictato-
rial military regimes of the right. Caldera's Venezuela
could no longer stand alone against regimes such as Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. This regime-type shift was a
decisive factor in conditioning the Venezuelan Christian
Democrat's foreign policy. Latin America was experiencing a
trend in which even a country like Chile, long believed to
be one of the most democratic in the hemisphere, succumbed
to a military coup. The military now saw itself as a perma-
nent and legitimate solution to the problem of political and
economic development in the region. The implication is that
if Caldera had continued the policy of non-recognition of de
facto regimes he would have dangerously isolated Venezuela
from the rest of the countries because he would have to have
suspended economic and diplomatic relations with most states
in the hemisphere. This thought was conveyed in Caldera's
inaugural speech of March 1969:
"We will maintain diplomatic and commer-
cial relations with all countries, inde-
pendent of the political orientation of
their internal regime... for their pres-
ence in the world and their influence 'n
economic relations cannot be ignored."
After assuming the presidency Caldera proceeded to re-
new relations with such diverse regimes as that of Ovando in
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Bolivia, Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Allende in Chile,
Stroessner in Paraguay, and Castro in Cuba with whom rela-
tions gradually improved.
One of the rationales behind Caldera's foreign policy,
again, was that if he had emphasized ideological differences
as a mean to sever relations with dictatorial right and/or
left wing regimes, he would have deprived Venezuela of po-
tential economic partners and therefore of possible new
sources of revenues. Caldera's COPEI, then, sought to in-
crease the country's economic power and its regional influ-
ence, and in order to do so the Venezuelan Christian
Democrats considered it propitious to maintain diplomatic
and economic relations with the great majority of states in
the hemisphere, regardless of the internal orientation of
their regime. That is how, through Ideological Pluralism,
democratic Venezuela not only justified pursuing relations
with non-democratic governments but also, as George Grayson
points out, through "its aggressive advocacy of ideological
pluralism, the Caracas government sees itself playing an in-
creasingly important leadership role among the developing
nations. "5
Also, through Ideological Pluralism, Caldera hoped to
ease the tensions created by the Betancourt Doctrine between
Venezuela and regional left and right wing regimes. Caldera
witnessed the many problems brought upon Betancourt's gov-
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ernment by the hatred and rage of Latin American dictators
who inspired and supported terrorist activities against Be-
tancourt. Thus, by preaching Ideological Pluralism or
"unity within diversity" Caldera sought to convey this sen-
timent: Let every one govern within his own borders. In
support of this point Charles Ameringer argues that as fur-
ther underpinning for his policy of pluralistic solidarity,
Caldera made an earnest request for respect for the princi-
ples of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention.6
Another important factor that must be considered as one
influencing the foreign policy of Caldera was domestic,
namely that internal democracy was being steadily consoli-
dated. It must be recalled that one of the reasons for Be-
tancourt not dealing with right or left wing dictators was
that he feared that the young Venezuelan democracy could be
easily threatened by ideologically different regimes. By
the time Caldera attained power, however, Venezuela's democ-
racy was consolidated, largely because it was a carefully
pacted one. The pact achieved between the three major po-
litical forces in the country ensured the continuation of
civilian governments and discouraged military intervention.
This may then explain why Caldera did not fear the domestic
repercussion of entering relations with regimes of different
ideological inclination, and moreover, tells something about
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the impact of domestic factors in conditioning foreign pol-
icy.
In conclusion, the changes in Venezuela's foreign pol-
icy after 1969 can be explained in terms of Caldera's need
to adjust to a new set of international political and eco-
nomic realities. The regime-type shift experienced in Latin
America was a factor that forced the Venezuelan president to
abandon the anti-dictatorial doctrine of his predecessor and
seek relations with the military men holding power in most
Latin American nations. Caldera's foreign policy was condi-
tioned also by domestic considerations such as his consid-
ered conviction about democratic consolidation in Venezuela.
Democratic consolidation in Venezuela was linked to toler-
ance for authoritarian regimes in the sense that the coun-
try's democracy, a carefully pacted one, was believed to be
consolidated and therefore free from any form of internal or
external militarily-inspired influence, and free to deal
with all countries regardless of their type of government.
2. Commitment to Expand Economic Power and Regional Influ-
ence Through Wealth.
Some of Venezuela's regional initiatives may help ex-
plain Caldera's foreign policy and the shift that occurred
after 1969. In this regard three factors will be analyzed:
a. Defense of oil prices.
b. Interest in the Caribbean.
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C. The Andean Common Market or Andean Pact.
a. Defense of Oil Prices.
The oil issue as well as many other crucial issues of
the Venezuelan Christian Democrats' foreign policy were ra-
tionalized in terms of Internal Social Justice. The central
idea was to unite with other lesser developed countries in
order to provide an economic front to contend with the in-
dustrialized states. Furthermore, International Social Jus-
tice meant to Caldera and to COPEI that they must struggle
to gain fair prices for Venezuela's raw materials, specifi-
cally oil. Therefore, when Venezuela and OPEC encouraged a
rise in oil prices they were of the opinion that such a move
was in accordance with the proposed wealth redistribution
advocated by International Social Justice. As stated by
Martz and Myers:
"The Social Christians were ... insis-
tent ... that oil earnings must con-
tribute to distributive justice ...
[they] encouraged global conditions that
might assure ... fair prices.
Also, speaking before the U.S. Congress during his
visit to the United States on June 3, 1970, President
Caldera had the opportunity to emphasize the relationship
between International Social Justice and the defense of the
prices of less developed countries' raw materials. Presi-
dent Caldera is reported to have said:
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"I believe in international social jus-
tice ... the formula for achieving cor-
dial relations ... cannot be the merci-
less attempts at forever lowering the
prices of our goods."
In the end, in trying to explain the impact of Interna-
tional Social Justice on the regime's foreign policy the
most relevant point is that the administration tried to seek
an accommodation of ideological tenets with economic real-
ity. President Caldera was urged to extract maximum benefit
from the oil resource in order to increase Venezuela's eco-
nomic power.
b. Interest in the Caribbean.
Discussion of Venezuela's new interest in the Caribbean
is relevant because it helps explain how Caldera's foreign
policy was shaped by Venezuela's desire to expand its power
and influence in the region. Venezuela's perception of the
Caribbean changed after 1969 mostly in response to the new
economic and political reality of the region. The region
began to be regarded as vital to Venezuela's national secu-
rity and economic interests. An area where the country's
newly acquired oil wealth could be put to work in order to
enhance its economic and political influence in the region.
As seen in Table 6, by the beginning of the 1970's, oil
prices raised considerably and Venezuela's oil revenues dra-
matically increased. Table 6 also shows the impact of the
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oil-price increase on the Caldera government's revenues in
relation to those of Betancourt.
TABLE 6
IMPACT OF OIL-PRICE INCREASE ON THE
CALDERA GOVERNMENT'S REVENUES
IN RELATION TO THOSE OF BETANCOURT
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Population Fiscal Crude's Income
in Income Price from
Mil. in $ per Oil
Mil.Bs. Barrel
Betancourt 8.0 Mil. 16,285 2.98 Bs.2,036.00
1959-63
Caldera 12.0 Mil. 36,952 5.80 Bs.3,079.00
1969-73 (Raised
to 9.91
in Sep
1973
One of the many factors determining Caldera's foreign
policy toward the Caribbean, and certainly one of the most
important, was his desire to enhance Venezuela's regional
influence. Judith Ewell supports this point when she af-
firms that, because of its population size, geographical ex-
tension and oil wealth, Venezuela had the potential for a
much greater regional influence than the multitude of small
Caribbean states, and therefore its influence and active
role could easily be extended.9 Evidence of Venezuela's re-
gional interest can be seen in the fact that it was the
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first non-English speaking nation to become a member of the
Caribbean Development Bank which was a lending agency for
the Caribbean Commonwealth. In its first year of membership
Venezuela contributed $13 million to the bank. 1 0  Interest
in the region also showed in the number of loans given to
individual states and in the proliferation of Venezuelan
banks and investments. Boersner argues that after Caldera
initiated the thrust toward the Caribbean, Venezuela's in-
dustrial bourgeoisie began to look overseas for markets.j1
Venezuela's commitment to expand its Caribbean influence was
also reflected in the tremendous promotion of tourism
launched by the government within and outside the country.
The New York Times noted that advertising to promote tourist
activities identified the country prior to 1969 as the front
door to South America, and now described it as "the country
in the Caribbean."12 Indeed, as Martz states:
"Such Venezuelan activities typified its
decision to enter the English-speaking
Caribbean, where commeisial ties had
historically been weak."
Another reason for increasing Venezuela's role in the
Caribbean was that the COPEI government feared Brazilian
economic regional influence. The beginning of the 1970s was
a period that witnessed the so-called Brazilian economic
miracle. Accordingly, due to economic growth and political
stability, Brazil seemed to be awakening to a new era, and
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its public and private investments dramatically increased
throughout the region. As this occurred, Venezuelan concern
over Brazilian regional expansion began to grow. It was,
then, within this context that Caldera initiated a more ac-
tive Venezuelan regional role. Grayson refers to this
Venezuelan growing concern: "Venezuela ... moved vigorously
... to check Brazilian influence and exert her own in the
Caribbean. "14 Bond stresses the same point:
"Calvani (Caldera's Foreign Minister)
feared Brazilian expansionism, and ap-
parently believed that Brazil desired to
extend its influence toward the
Caribbean. "1
Accordingly, Venezuela initiated a period of intense
negotiations with the Anglophone and Hispanophone Caribbean
as well. One of the most important achievements was the
institutionalization of relations with the Caribbean as
reflected in the various conferences held by foreign
ministers of Venezuela and their counterparts in the rest of
the Caribbean.1 6  There seems to be reason to believe that
Venezuela was successful in its design to disguise the real
intention of its Caribbean thrust with its emphasis on Ideo-
logical Pluralism and International Social Justice. Perhaps
one of the exceptions was Trinidad Tobago's Prime Minister
Eric Williams, who accused Venezuela of seeking to recolo-
nize the Caribbean. 1 7
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Williams' perception of Venezuela of course was not un-
founded. Venezuela's newly found oil wealth was being chan-
nelled toward the Caribbean and Caldera's government was
committed to extract maximum benefits from this
relationship. Venezuela's desire for domination was clearly
expressed not only by government officials but also by the
most refined Venezuelan students of geopolitics. For
example, Ruben Carpio Castillo acknowledged that geographic
factors and natural wealth could give "Venezuela greater
power in the possible formation of a Caribbean
Federation. "18 Obviously, such a statement supports the
idea that Venezuela desired to dominate the region, and
fuels any suspicion that it intended to do so. Williams'
perception of Venezuela's desire for regional supremacy was
reinforced by the fact that by the beginning of the 1970s,
Venezuela did not have to face the European powers' colonial
outposts in the Caribbean, but instead a group of small,
relatively weak, newly independent states.
Ironically, Williams himself wanted to assume regional
leadership but he found in the Latin country a more powerful
competitor. Venezuela's oil wealth far exceeded that of
Trinidad's which allowed Caldera's Venezuela to enhance its
means for capitalist penetration and influence in the re-
gion.
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In the end, Caldera's government was rhetorically try-
ing to show that its country was motivated by the search for
unity among regional countries, and by the desire to con-
tribute to the development of these countries through Ideo-
logical Pluralism and International Social Justice. Facts
brought out here, however, demonstrate that Venezuela was
instead trying to emerge as a "semi-peripheral" nation. As
already shown, the desire to increase Venezuela's regional
influence, as well as fear of Brazilian expansionism, were
among the factors that dictated the foreign policy of
Caldera's Christian Democratic party during the years 1969-
1974.
C. The Andean Common Market or Andean Pact.
Venezuela's decision to join the Andean Common Market
(originally made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and
Peru) in February 1973 reflects the COPEI government's de-
sire to increase Venezuelan regional influence. There were
political and economic reasons that prompted Venezuela to
enter in the Andean Common Market or Andean Pact: First,
the desire to increase Venezuela's economic power and the
need to diversify the economy. Secondly, the commitment to
counteract Brazilian and U.S. regional domination. It is in
this context that the Caldera government pursued political
and economic interests in the name of Ideological Pluralism
and International Social Justice, by committing itself to
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having relations with as many Latin American and Caribbean
countries as possible. Evidently, relations with Marxist
Chile or Bolivia's rightist dictatorship would have been im-
possible had the Caldera government discriminated on the ba-
sis of ideology.
The primary focus of the government, then, was to
broaden the number of Venezuela's trade and economic part-
ners, hoping that by gaining access to the markets of the
Andean Pact members, Venezuela's economic power would be in-
creased. In contrast to the rest of the Pact's members, by
the time she joined the Common Market, Venezuela was experi-
encing a consistent growth rate, a stable currency and a
readily available supply of capital. This made it possible
for Venezuela to penetrate the other countries' economies
and by means of its economic power create spheres of influ-
ence. As Robert D. Bond points out, "Venezuela's actions in
several sub-regions aroused suspicions that it was trying to
carve out spheres of influence."1 9  When Venezuela joined
the Andean Pact, then, it had the opportunity to put to work
the millions in extra revenue derived from increased oil
prices. Venezuela contributed $60 million to the Corpo-
raci6n Andina de Fomento, an agency established to serve as
financial agent for Andean Pact members. 2 0
Interest in joining the Andean Common Market was stimu-
lated also by the fact that Venezuela's economy, largely
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based on income from petroleum, needed to diversify. During
the years Caldera was in power, for example, the oil indus-
try provided 93% of the country's foreign exchange and more
than 70% of its budget.21 With such heavy dependence on oil
the country's economy was doomed to collapse when oil re-
serves were depleted. Thus, Caldera's government considered
it expedient to enhance diversification through participa-
tion in the pact. In addition to gaining access to new mar-
kets, joining the Pact would reorient the economy towards
diversification. Such a change would not come automatically
but now Venezuela was encouraged to produce manufactured and
other products for consumption in Andean Pact's markets,
thus creating new sources of revenues and consequently di-
minishing overdependence on oil. Ferris, for example, ar-
gues: "domestic economic adversity leads to increase re-
gional cooperation.. ."22 In summary, the Caldera adminis-
tration feared the negative effects that an absolute depen-
dence on oil would eventually bring upon the country's econ-
omy. It also hoped that by gaining access to new markets it
would not only have new sources of revenue, but would also
encourage diversification as new products from Venezuela be-
gan to be sold in the Andean States.
The second part of the argument has to do with Brazil-
ian and U.S. regional domination. Ewell asserts that in de-
ciding to join the Common Market, Caldera assumed that the
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Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America had to combine
forces if they were to keep Brazilian economic expansion un-
der control.23 Ewell's argument falls in line with the
logic of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
and Latin American populism whose focus in on regional inte-
gration. The Venezuelan president, then, argued in favor of
the Andean Market on economic and security grounds. Evi-
dently he felt he needed to join the Pact in order not only
to extend Venezuelan influence in the region but also to
check Brazilian regional initiatives. Venezuela's suspi-
cions about Brazil became even greater as the latter pro-
posed the creation of the Amazon Treaty. This treaty, as
perceived by Venezuela, was intended to confront the Andean
Pact. Moreover, the Brazilian proposal, as Elizabeth Ferris
argues, might have been "seeking to coopt the Andean coun-
tries by including them in a Brazilian-dominated group."2 4
Venezuela became one of the most outspoken critics of
Brazilian initiatives in the region and in doing this it
achieved some success. Venezuela was committed to not stand
aloof from a regional power struggle and strove to enhance
its own influence. As stated by Ameringer:
"By the time that Caldera neared the end
of his term, he was successfully chal-
lenging Brazil and other emerging powers
of Latin America for a position of lead-
ership ... He recognized Venezuela's in-
creasing economic power and strove to
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use it to extend the nation's influ-
ence ... .25
It appears obvious then that Caldera's Ideological Plu-
ralism and International Social Justice were simply an ide-
ological fagade used to justify a two-power struggle for
subregional domination. Venezuela strove to contain the gi-
ant Brazil's economic influence while Brazil sought to coun-
teract Venezuela's increased regional power derived from its
oil wealth.
Needless to say, Venezuela's initiative to join the An-
dean Pact was determined also by the hemispheric influence
of the United States. This assertion requires a two-fold
explanation. First of all, Venezuela became highly suspi-
cious of U.S. favoritism for Brazil as the dominant subre-
gional power. Brazil's geopolitical and economic importance
to the United States in the subregion may have contributed
to promote more favorable American relations with the giant
of the South than with any other country in the region.
Among the evidence that demonstrates this U.S. bias in Latin
America is an agreement signed between the United States and
Brazil in which the Americans gave Brazil the "privilege" to
discuss important issues with them twice a year.26 Also,
according to the Caracas newspaper El Nacional, Kissinger's
comments regarding Brazil tend to identify the United States
86
with that South American country. Accordingly, Kissinger
said:
"Brazil is destined to join the club of
rich countries... it is inevitable and
truly desirable. "27
Another rationale for membership, then, was that through the
Andean Pact, Venezuela was seeking to promote strong unity
among Spanish-speaking Latin American nations in order to
counteract United States' favoritism for Brazil.
Also Caldera reasoned that by joining the Andean Pact
the members could as a common bloc, demand equal treatment
from Washington. On several occasions the Venezuelan presi-
dent reminded the United States that it was its duty to help
the Latin American developing countries achieve their objec-
tives. 2 8 As demonstrated by Venezuela's encouragement of a
rise in oil prices, the Caldera administration believed it
was a U.S. obligation to pay higher prices for Venezuelan
crude as a means to help this country achieve its goals and
as a way to fall in line with the wealth redistribution pro-
posed by International Social Justice. Herman, referring to
this issue states:
"The concept not only explained United
States obligation toward Venezuela and
Latin America, but it also provided a
rationale for steps taken to increase
Venezuela's economic power, particularly
... increasng the export price of
petroleum. "
87
Finally, Caldera's COPEI realized that though still
subject to U.S. hemispheric domination, the common bloc
formed through the Andean Pact, would provide for pact mem-
bers a more advantageous position to confront the United
States. Caldera reasoned that what the Americans sought was
to divide and manipulate countries individually. That is
one of the reasons why Venezuela stressed unity within di-
versity or Ideological Pluralism in order to oppose the
United States as a bloc.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the foreign policy of Venezuela during
the period of Caldera's Ideological Pluralism can be most
profitably understood in terms of Venezuela's pursuit of
economic and security goals, rather than in terms of advo-
cacy of an ideological posture. It explains how Christian
Democracy's major tenets, Ideological Pluralism and Interna-
tional Social Justice were used as a fagade to justify the
pursuit of political and economic interests on ideological
grounds. This conclusion is supported by Martz: "It would
be misleading to maintain that ... Caldera ... was unduly
constrained in his policies by ideological blinders ... ide-
ology was merely helpful in rationalizing decisions already
made."30
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In the hope of increasing the country's economic power
the COPEI government initiated a round of intense negotia-
tions with all regional governments regardless of ideologi-
cal choice of internal regimes. Venezuela's newly found
wealth as a result of a dramatic increase in oil prices,
provided the means to create spheres of influence in the
Caribbean and the Andean region.
Also, fear of Brazilian regional domination prompted
the Caldera administration to intensify Venezuela's role in
the region. Brazil's power, coupled with the apparent fa-
voritism on the part of the United States, intensified be-
fore the relatively individual weakness of the rest of Latin
American states. This led Venezuela to seek closer economic
and political ties with neighboring Andean countries. In
addition, through membership in the Andean Common Market,
Venezuela sought to diversify its economy, create new
sources of wealth and diminish overdependence on oil rev-
enues.
In the end, Caldera's foreign policy was purely a prag-
matic one because it consisted of making practical decisions
for the achievement of material goals. COPEI's philosophi-
cal tenets did not determine Caldera's foreign policy, but
instead it was the new realities of the domestic and re-
gional environment that dictated the course of his foreign
policy. Again, Ideological Pluralism and International So-
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cial Justice were just the means to hide the pursuit of na-
tional interests which lay behind ideology. As noted by
Liss:
"The socialistic party platform of ...
COPEI has had little influence on the
conduct of foreign policy, which has
been carried on under the influence of
traditional, 3 ometimes liberal, economic
capitalism."
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This concluding chapter is the linking chapter in the
present study. It defines the importance of the preceding
chapters, and fits chapters two and three into the concep-
tual frame work of chapter one. This section will also look
at the findings of this study and their significance. Fi-
nally, some speculative propositions will be made regarding
the possibility of applying the present approach to other
cases.
We now briefly summarize Betancourt's foreign policy
first, followed by Caldera's. As examined in chapter two,
the foreign policy of Venezuela during the period of the
Betancourt Doctrine was not determined by Betancourt's
inexorable adherence to democracy but by U.S. pressure and
his desire to remain in power. Ideology only had a minor
impact on conditioning Venezuela's foreign policy, and it
functioned as the means to justify and/or hide the pursuit
of political and economic interests rather than as a
determinant of foreign policy.
Chapter three showed that when Caldera's COPEI attained
power in 1969 it claimed to be firmly committed to interna-
tional political economy based on the principle "of coopera-
tion, of free access to the sources of wealth for all peo-
91
ple, and of the application of social justice."'' This, how-
ever, was only the rationale the Venezuelan Christian
Democrats gave to justify their pursuit of regional economic
and political interests because Caldera's foreign policy
consisted of making practical decisions for the achievement
of material goals. COPEI's philosophical tenets, Ideologi-
cal Pluralism and International Social Justice, did not de-
termine Caldera's foreign policy, but instead it was the new
realities of the domestic and regional environment that dic-
tated the course of his foreign policy. Again, ideology was
only the means to hide the pursuit of national interests.
In establishing the theoretical linkages and defining
the importance of this case study it is seen that the
Venezuelan case is linked to the arguments of some theo-
rists. Morganthau, for example, argues that the key concept
governing the actions of statesmen in international politics
is that of interests defined as power.2  Caldera's foreign
policy supports Morganthau's remarks. Accordingly, Caldera
used Venezuela's oil wealth to penetrate the economies of
Caribbean and Andean states to gain some control of the eco-
nomic decision-making in those countries. In doing that,
therefore, Venezuela was accused of wanting to recolonize
the region by exerting its economic power. These facts
clearly demonstrate that Venezuela's Christian Democrats did
not at all reject capitalism on the basis of its exploita-
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tive nature (as stated in Christian Democratic Doctrine) but
instead advocated it in pursuing regional foreign policy
goals, or as Morganthau would put it, their foreign policy
was governed by interests defined in terms of power rather
than by any philosophical conviction.
Morganthau argues also that power controls the actions
of men in international relations,3 meaning, of course,
that the actions of weak states are constrained and/or
driven by the economic, political or military power of the
strong ones. This was such in the case of the Betancourt
Doctrine because Betancourt's foreign policy was, to a large
extent, dictated by the economic power of the United States.
Betancourt knew that the survival of his government depended
on the protection and promotion of U.S. economic interests
in Venezuela, and that U.S. capital expansion was crucial
for his political survival. That is why it is not difficult
to explain why the Betancourt Doctrine coincided with the
U.S. anti-communist struggle in the hemisphere.
Caldera's foreign policy was also conditioned by the
power factor referred to by Morganthau. His decision to in-
crease Venezuela's role in the region was significantly de-
termined by the influence that powerful Brazil was beginning
to exert in the region. Moreover, Brazil's power, coupled
with the apparent favoritism of the United States for Brazil
as regional leader, intensified Venezuela's desire to seek
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closer relations with neighboring states, thus revealing how
the economic and political power of the United States and
Brazil dictated Venezuela's foreign policy.
Cardoso and Faletto contend that relations between
states are characterized by a dependent situation in which
the state in the dependent nations plays a mediating role
between dominant classes in the central or dominating state
and the peripheral or dominated state. The state, accord-
ingly, functions as a channel for foreign capital transfer,
thus making available foreign resources to the privileged
classes.4 This study has shown that neither AD nor COPEI
showed any firm determination to resist U.S. capitalist ex-
pansion in Venezuela but instead, they were aware that their
economic performance largely depended on U.S. capital in-
flow. The case of Betancourt, for instance, shows that the
amount of U.S. economic aid and U.S. investments in
Venezuela was such that it was clear that the Betancourt
government remained in large measure alive through the in-
flow of U.S. money. In this process of capital transfer,
the Venezuelan state, headed by Betancourt, served as a me-
diator between U.S. capital and Venezuela's dominant
classes, therefore corroborating Cardoso and Faletto's view
regarding the mediating role of the state.
Moreover, the above confirms the contention of depen-
dency theorists who argue that as a result of the ties es-
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tablished between dominant elites in the dependent and domi-
nant countries, the internal and external conditions of the
dependent country are effected. The final result of such
relationship, they say, is a high degree of agreement be-
tween the foreign and domestic policies of a dependent coun-
try and the economic, political and security interests of a
dominating one.5 This correlation, emphasized by scholars
in the dependency tradition, stands out especially as it
conditioned Betancourt's doctrine and his relations with the
United States.
Regarding the issue of foreign policy and how this is
conditioned by other countries, Morganthau states, "It is
not enough for a government to marshal national public opin-
ion behind its foreign policies. It must also gain the sup-
port of ... other nations ... " 6 Obviously Morganthau is
saying that the foreign policy of a country is conditioned
by the degree of support it gets from external actors. Oth-
erwise, the foreign policy may be doomed to failure. The
above theorist's hypothesis is substantiated by evidence
brought out in this study. The issue of the United States
recognition of the Betancourt Doctrine, for example, became
crucial to Betancourt if dictatorship were going to be dis-
couraged and isolated. However, failure to get the United
States to withhold recognition from such regimes contributed
to the weakening of the Betancourt Doctrine and consequently
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to the deposing of Betancourt's AD in 1948. This reflects
how failure to get the support of other nations (the United
States) contributed to the lack of success of a country's
(Venezuela) foreign policy.
Quite to the contrary, support received from Latin
American and Caribbean nations allowed the Caldera govern-
ment to achieve considerable success in accomplishing estab-
lished regional goals. Ideological Pluralism and Interna-
tional Social Justice, though only an ideological facade,
appealed to most states in the hemisphere especially in
light of the fact that they all demanded better treatment
from the United States.
The present study corroborates Reynolds' argument that
action on the part of a one state is constrained by per-
ceived domestic circumstances as well as by the actions of
other states, and how the first state perceives other
states. 7 He refers to the fact that foreign policy making
must take into account the decision-makers' perception of
domestic and international factors, and that these will in
turn conditions the actions of a state. The case of Betan-
court shows how his perception of domestic circumstances and
of the United States influenced his foreign policy. When
Betancourt applied the Betancourt Doctrine to Castro's Cuba,
for example, he was well aware that not to do so would bring
economic disaster upon his government since U.S. Aid and in-
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vestments in Venezuela would have stopped. Thus, Betan-
court's perception of internal and external circumstances
led him to avoid the potential worst consequences in con-
ducting his foreign policy.
Caldera's foreign policy too, was very much conditioned
by his perception of domestic circumstances as well as by
the actions of other states. As seem before, Brazil's in-
fluence in the region was one of the factors that awakened
Venezuela's interests in expanding its regional role. The
Venezuela Christian Democrats feared that if Venezuela did
not become more active in the region, Brazil would be free
to exert regional domination, thus threatening Venezuela's
overdependence on oil for revenues was another factor that
constrained him to take a certain course of action in his
foreign policy. Awareness concerning this fact led him to
seek membership in the Andean Common Market which would give
Venezuela the opportunity to produce new products for con-
sumption in Andean states. This would in turn initiate a
degree of economic diversification, thus diminishing overde-
pendence on oil and creating new sources of revenue. It is
obvious, then, that Venezuela's foreign policy was indeed
conditioned by the actions of other states as well as by
Venezuelan leaders' perception of those other states and
their perception of domestic circumstances.
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A well known factor, brought out again in this study,
is that foreign policy is not made in a vacuum, meaning that
in analyzing foreign policy, domestic and international as
well as economic and political factors must be considered.
Blake and Walters point out the rather obvious fact that a
complete understanding of global relations cannot be at-
tained unless the necessary linkages between the aforemen-
tioned factors are established.8 In the cases of the Betan-
court Doctrine and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism the pre-
sent study has shown that these were indeed conditioned by
the interconnection referred to by Blake and Walters. Ben-
tancourt, for instance, first considered the repercussions
that an internation political factor such as U.S. anti-com-
munist policies could bring upon his domestic economic and
political issues. Then he became an all-out supporter of
U.S. policies in the hemisphere. Caldera's Caribbean and
Andean thrust, for its part, was initiated after he gave due
consideration to the domestic economic and political impact
that such external factor as Brazilian regional influence
could bring. Thus, it is seen how these various sets of in-
terrelationships between economic, political, domestic and
international factors conditioned and/or limited Betancourt
and Caldera's foreign policy actions.
In agreement with Blake and Walters, this contends that
Venezuela's domestic welfare depends on the country's in-
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ternational economic relations, and that its foreign policy
is more than ever influenced by the oil industry.9 This ar-
gument is in direct correlation with the present thesis.
Findings brought out here showed how Venezuela's overdepen-
dence on a mostly American-dominated oil industry condi-
tioned Betancourt's foreign policy toward the United States.
Also, this study has demonstrated that Caldera's foreign
policy was closely linked to the oil issue because the in-
creased revenue, generated as a result of a rise in oil
prices, served to support the Venezuelan Christian
Democrats' Caribbean and Andean commitments.
Tugwell, for his part, points out that oil politics in
Venezuela have come to operate as an independent variable in
regard to most other policy-making areas. 10 This statement
is confirmed by what has been said of Venezuela during the
periods of Betancourt and Caldera's rule. Oil was so impor-
tant to them that its influence on their foreign policies
could hardly be overstated.
There are some foreign policy theorists who argue that
in examining the most important factors that condition for-
eign policy one cannot ignore the role of certain societal
or domestic issues. Rosenau, for example, states that there
are domestic forces such as the press, economic groups, par-
ties and others whose role in determining foreign policy is
not less important than the external forces toward which the
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foreign policy is intended to be directed." This con-
tention is fully supported by the present study because the
Betancourt Doctrine and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism were
to a considerable degree made possible by the support re-
ceived from opposition parties, privileged economic groups,
etc. There can be little doubt that Betancourt and Caldera
could ever have attained power, let alone carry out their
foreign policies, without the role of such a crucial domes-
tic factor as party support or the mutual support achieved
between Accion Democrdtica, Copei and Union Republicana
Democratica (URD). The 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo was the
highlight of this mutual collaboration. This coalition not
only allowed Betancourt's AD to come to power in 1959 to im-
plement the Betancourt Doctrine, but it also paved the way
for the continuation of a civilian government that would
later allow Caldera and his Ideological Pluralism to perform
from the presidential seat. The Punto Fijo Pact, then, sup-
ports the argument regarding the important role of domestic
forces in shaping foreign policy.
K. London supports the idea that there are basic fac-
tors such as a nation's physical, political, economic and
military conditions that must not be ignored in making for-
eign policy. These, he terms, national attributes.1 2 Obvi-
ously London means that these factors can determine the lim-
its or the range of statesmen in formulating foreign policy
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and therefore in planning their course of action. States-
men, accordingly, are limited by their available resources
but they can convert these into the main force behind their
foreign policy decisions. The Betancourt Doctrine reflects
the influence that some of these national attributes or na-
tional economic and political conditions mentioned by London
had upon that doctrine. Economically, Betancourt needed the
assistance of U.S. capital to get the country out of the
economic difficulties it was in. He, then, strove to shape
his foreign policy in agreement with Washington's to obtain
American economic help. Politically, the effects of the
economic crisis and the fact that the Betancourt government
was so young, coupled with the threat of a military
takeover, moved Betancourt to stay with the United States
and simultaneously to suspend relations with all dictatorial
regimes in the hemisphere for fear that these might influ-
ence his government and threaten his position and power.
These findings obviously reflect how the consideration of
domestic political and economic conditions affected the for-
eign policy of Venezuela.
Caldera's foreign policy too, substantiates London's
contention regarding the role of national attributes in
shaping foreign policy. Venezuela's Christian Democrats be-
lieved that due to its size, economic power and political
stability, Venezuela was capable of making an impact on the
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region, and this they were determined to accomplish. The
small size and economic weakness of the conglomerate of
Caribbean states, and the economic and political problems
plaguing the Andean countries enhanced Caldera's confidence
and his determination to play an active role in both areas.
Therefore, he resolutely launched his regional thrust as an
attempt to use Venezuela's "national attributes" in pursuing
his foreign policy goals. This confirms the contention that
statesmen can convert their available resources into the
main force behind their foreign policies.
According to Millar much of a country's foreign policy
is inherited, meaning that history and events are among the
most important factors that condition foreign policy. 13
Millar's view relates to that of Lowi in that past events
and experiences not only shape foreign policy but they help
contribute to produce a different type of leadership.14
This study showed how Venezuela's long history of dictator-
ships shaped a new type of democratic leadership and conse-
quently of foreign policy. Historically, the Venezuelan
state had been regarded as private property by the military
dictators who hold power. Foreign policy, then was geared
to protect and increase the assets of the dictator in power
and not necessarily those of the country. However, technol-
ogy, newly-found riches and political discontent called for
a change, beginning about a new system dominated by civilian
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leadership such as that of Bentancourt and Caldera. This
new leadership type, brought in turn a reorientation in
Venezuela's foreign policy, now geared to promote political
changes and populist reforms. It is seen, then, how the
country's past history and events shaped the emergence of a
distinctive type of leadership and foreign policy.
Frankel, for his part, argues that there is an "inner
element" that is crucial in the determination of foreign
policy and defines "inner element" as the ideologies,
beliefs and values that may influence statesmen in
formulating their foreign policies.15 The present study
however, shows that ideology had very little impact in the
determination of Venezuela's foreign policy, and that it
functioned only as a means to rationalize practical
decisions already made. In the case of Betancourt, for
example, we have found that the Betancourt Doctrine was
motivated by his desire to gain U.S. economic and political
support, and by his commitment to remain in power. Needless
to say. Betancourt's decision to not deal with dictatorial
military regimes of the right or left was not determined by
his inexorable commitment to democratic ideals, but by his
desire to protect his hold on power.
It was only in the case of OPEC that this study re-
vealed a connection between Betancourt and Acci6n Democrat-
ica's populist logic and foreign policy. Accordingly, two
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of the major tenets of populism, social justice and state-
controlled natural resources, influenced the Betancourt ad-
ministration to seek negotiations with other oil producers
in the Arab Worlds. These moves demonstrated the Venezuelan
government's desire to enhance the country's possibilities
to get fairer returns for its oil resources, and in that way
bring a more equal relationship between the have nots
(Venezuela) and the haves (United States and other industri-
alized countries.) The move toward the formation of OPEC
also demonstrated Betancourt's populism as he tried to in-
crease state control and management of Venezuela's natural
resources.
In the case of Caldera, the present study has shown
that the major priority of Caldera and COPEI's foreign pol-
icy was to check Brazilian sway and increase Venezuelan eco-
nomic and political influence in the region. They were com-
mitted to accomplish regional goals, that is, expand
Venezuela's role in the Caribbean and the Andean regions
through the use of oil wealth. In doing this, then the
Venezuelan leaders hoped not only to gain access to the mar-
kets of those countries in the region with which they became
involved bur also to diversify the country's economy as
Venezuela began to produce new products to be sold in the
Caribbean and Andean regions. Obviously, this diversifica-
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tion would diminish Venezuela's overdependence on oil for
revenues.
The research conducted for this study supports the
findings of theorists such as London, Morganthau, Marx and
others who argue that ideology is just an artificial or su-
perficial appearance used to hide the real intentions driv-
ing statesmen in the formation of domestic and foreign poli-
cies. London states that ideology is used to justify poli-
cies and actions but that these are not shaped by ideol-
ogy.16 Ideologies for Morganthau are no more than disguises
used to hide the pursuit of sel-interests and power. 7 Marx
argues that ideologies only exist to maintain the ends and
purposes of the dominant classes.18 It is obvious, then,
that Marx's view on ideology relates to that of Morgenthau's
in the sense that they both acknowledge that ideologies are
used to seek, keep, and justify power. Taking these theo-
retical assumptions in the context of the findings of this
study, it is clear that the Betancourt Doctrine and
Caldera's Ideological Pluralism and International Social
Justice were only the ideological frame works used to hide,
rationalize and justify Venezuela's foreign policy goals.
Without this ideological disguise, Betancourt would have
been perceived as one selling out the country to U.S. capi-
talist interests, while Caldera would have appeared as one
wanting, as Williams said, to recolonize the region.
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These findings clearly corroborate the argument that
statesmen are not driven by ideologies in pursuing their
policies but instead by practical considerations. They tend
to refute therefore the contention that a leader's beliefs
are of predominant importance when he develops his foreign
policy.
Thus, there is evidence in support of this study's ini-
tial hypothesis that the foreign policy of Betancourt was
not determined by ideology but by the domination of the
United States in the Western hemisphere, and by Betancourt's
commitment to improve Venezuela's economic condition as a
means for him to remain in power. Also, it was corroborated
that Betancourt sought to take the best possible advantage
of the dependent situation he was in under U.S. capitalist
expansionism. Evidence brought out in this study seems to
demonstrate, too, that Caldera's commitment to expand
Venezuela's regional influence and economic power through
wealth, determined his foreign policy. Ideology, then, was
for Caldera as well as for Betancourt a rationalization for
decisions already made.
The findings of this study support most of the theoret-
ical assumptions discussed in the initial chapter. Only in
few cases have the contentions of theorists been refuted by
the investigation and conclusions arrived at in the present
study.
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What is the importance of these findings and how can
they be applied to other cases? It seems appropriate to say
that under the unequal international economic system that
presently operates, it is very likely that the foreign poli-
cies of less-developed states will be greatly conditioned,
restrained and/or compelled by the dominating influence of
powerful, more-developed states. This unequal relationship
nurtures and perpetuates a dependent situation in which the
foreign policies of the weakest states is in most cases in
direct correlation with the economic, political and security
interests of the strongest nations. Only radical detours
from the established order or status-quo seem to give devel-
oping countries a somewhat more independent path, but in do-
ing this, less-developed states tend to suffer because con-
comitant with their shift away from a powerful nation's dom-
ination is the loss of economic support from the same.
Another factor that seems certain is that less-devel-
oped states will use all kinds of rhetoric and ideologies to
justify dependence and/or to contend against the unfair dom-
ination to which they are subject. The Betancourt Doctrine
and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism and International Social
Justice are a clear reflection of this dichotomy. The for-
mer tried to justify dependence on the United States while
the latter strove to contend against that dependence for the
sake of economic equality. Needless to say, claims on the
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part of the have-nots are only rhetoric and a means to
achieve goals because as Morganthau argues, all nations are
engaged in a struggle for power, and even their ideological
rhetoric is defined in terms of power. Ideological Plural-
ism and International Social Justice, for example, gave
Venezuela a voice to contend against the unfair economic
domination of the outside industrialized world while she si-
multaneously practiced regional economic domination.
It is important, therefore, in studying the foreign
policies of states that the analyst avoid the misleading as-
sumption that the foreign policies of statesmen are derived
from their ideological beliefs. Ideology has indeed very
little impact in determining the course of a nation's inter-
national behavior, but its use serves two purposes: to gain
the support of domestic public opinion, and justification
before the public opinion of other nations.
A factor that seems to play a determinant role in con-
ditioning foreign policy is the link that exists between do-
mestic and external forces. It would be a mistake to be-
lieve that international affairs are eclipsed by domestic
issues in formulating foreign policy, or vice versa. Exter-
nal concerns appear to affect foreign policy makers in
charting a course for their countries in the international
milieu. Also, foreign policy seems largely conditioned by
the domestic economic, social and political circumstances
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prevailing in a country. The success, therefore, of foreign
policy depends on how well statesmen take into account both
factors in formulating foreign policy.
Finally, the foreign policy of dependent states like
Venezuela is not doctrinal but pragmatic. No matter how
much ideological rhetoric they use, their positions are al-
ways open to changes and conciliations, all according to the
dictates of the international economic system to which they
are subject. There appears to be, then, an obvious correla-
tion between the foreign policies of dominated states and
the interests of powerful transnational capital.
It is important to emphasize, however, the limitations
of the present study, and to acknowledge that some of the
conclusions are subject to revision. The author believes
the conclusion to be acceptable but subject to further veri-
fication and research. There is indeed a real possibility
of applying the present approach to other cases, especially
to those cases like that of Venezuela where a dependent sit-
uation predominates. Therefore, the writer believes that
the generalizations and conclusions in the present study are
consistent with the international behavior of states in
their developing stage.
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